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Abstract 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is an imagery-based therapeutic intervention to target aversive 
autobiographical memories in emotional disorders. By activating an aversive memory in 
imagination and then changing the imagined situation according to the individual’s emotional 
needs, ImRs aims to update the idiosyncratic meaning of the original event. It is assumed that 
as a consequence recurrent intrusive images, dysfunctional beliefs, and negative emotions are 
reduced. Although there is growing evidence for the efficacy of ImRs in different disorders, 
research into its working mechanisms is only in its infancy. Laboratory-based studies in 
healthy individuals have been proven a suitable means to investigate mechanisms underlying 
psychological treatments under highly controlled conditions. In the context of ImRs research, 
laboratory-based studies have mainly used aversive films to induce distressing memories and 
associated stress symptoms which were then targeted using ImRs. However, the personal 
relevance of film-induced memories is limited and the ecological validity of the ImRs 
intervention is reduced given that the rescripting does not address memories of experiences, in 
which participants had been actively involved in. Aiming to overcome these limitations the 
current thesis presents different laboratory-based research approaches to investigate working 
mechanisms of ImRs for autobiographical memories of distressing real-life events. 
Study I and II involved a preliminary examination of potential working mechanisms by testing 
whether ImRs enhances perceived mastery of aversive experiences (“memory revaluation”) 
and leads to reduced emotional and physiological responding to memory retrieval. In Study I, 
healthy participants (N = 65) who had experienced a distressing life-event were randomly 
assigned to ImRs or a no-intervention control group (NIC). The memory of the life-event was 
reactivated before the intervention and at 1-week follow-up to assess memory-related 
processes. Study II aimed to optimize this analogue procedure by integrating physiological 
assessments in addition to self-report measures and an additional active control condition. 
Healthy individuals (N = 79) reporting memories of distressing real-life events were randomly 
allocated to ImRs, positive imagery (PI) or NIC. Subjective and physiological reactivity (heart 
rate, skin conductance level, and facial electromyography activity) in response to memory 
retrieval were assessed before the intervention and at 1-week follow-up. In Study I ImRs 
increased perceived mastery of aversive life-events when compared to NIC, however, this 
treatment effect could unexpectedly not be replicated in Study II. In both studies, distress and 
negative emotions in response to memory retrieval were reduced with ImRs when compared 
to NIC and PI. Physiological reactivity to the memories was attenuated at follow-up with no 
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differences between groups (Study II). Taken together, findings from Studies I and II only 
partially supported the notion that ImRs might work by changing dysfunctional meanings of 
mastery (“memory revaluation”) and reducing problematic emotional and physiological 
responses to the memory.  
Study III aimed to investigate the effects of ImRs compared to cognitive restructuring (CR) 
for social anxiety and to extend previous research by examining potential working 
mechanisms. During ImRs, corrective information is provided in the form of mental images, 
which have been found to have a powerful impact on emotions. It has been suggested that 
positive meanings offered in the form of images during ImRs might be more emotionally 
anchored than meanings generated as verbal representations (e.g., during CR). Therefore, 
Study III aimed to test whether ImRs works through emotionally anchored reappraisal of 
memory-related dysfunctional beliefs. Highly socially anxious individuals (N = 77) were 
randomly allocated to ImRs, CR, or NIC. Outcome measures were administered at baseline 
and 1-week follow-up. Only CR led to substantial reductions in social anxiety symptoms at 
follow-up. ImRs led to stronger increases in positive emotions than CR and NIC. Both active 
treatments yielded immediate reductions in emotionally anchored idiosyncratic self-beliefs, 
but CR was superior to ImRs at follow-up. Findings did not support the hypothesis that 
emotionally anchored reappraisal of dysfunctional beliefs is a working mechanism specific 
for ImRs. However, the interpretation of results on potential working mechanisms was limited 
as the clinical efficacy of ImRs for social anxiety symptoms could not be modelled in the 
subclinical sample. 
 Using a series of laboratory-based analogue studies, the present thesis aimed to shed light on 
the working mechanisms of ImRs. Findings from the current studies add to our knowledge on 
processes that might underlie the therapeutic efficacy of ImRs, although only preliminary 
conclusions can be drawn about potential working mechanisms. An investigation of processes 
involved in ImRs within the presented research paradigms appears to be promising, but 
modifications are necessary as the clinical efficacy of ImRs could not be modelled reliably. 
Possible directions for future research into working mechanisms of ImRs are outlined. 
Moreover, potentials and limitations of laboratory-based investigations in the context of ImRs 
are discussed. 
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Aversive autobiographical memories in emotional disorders  
“Autobiographical memory is memory for the events of one’s life. […] [I]t constitutes a 
major crossroads in human cognition where considerations relating to the self, emotion, goals, 
and personal meanings all intersect” (Conway & Rubin, 1993, p. 103). Autobiographical 
memories of personally experienced events are central to human functioning (Williams et al., 
2007). They are crucial for an individual’s orientation in the world, for successful goal pursuit 
and problem solving, and for the formation of a sense of self (Williams et al., 2007; Conway, 
2005). However, when individuals experience highly distressing or traumatic events, 
autobiographical memories can become a burden, which may contribute to the development 
of an emotional disorder (e.g., Brewin, 2011; Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 2000; Martins-
Monteverde, 2019; Norton & Abbott, 2017). 
For example, in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) persistent involuntary memories 
of traumatic events, which are experienced in form of distressing intrusive mental images, 
constitute a hallmark symptom of the disorder (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 
2013). In recent years, there has been growing evidence that intrusive memories of past 
negative events do not only play a role in PTSD, but are a common feature of many emotional 
disorders (Brewin, Gregory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Hirsch & Holmes, 2007; Holmes & 
Mathews, 2010), including social anxiety disorder (SAD; e.g. Hackmann et al., 2000; Norton 
& Abbott, 2017), depression (e.g., Holmes, Blackwell, Heyes, Renner, & Raes, 2016), and 
eating disorders (e.g., Somerville, Cooper, & Hackmann, 2007). Intrusive memories are 
typically experienced as spontaneously occurring, involuntary vivid mental images, which 
may also comprise sensory-perceptual elements of the event, such as somatic, auditory, 
olfactory, or gustatory elements (Brewin et al., 2010; Holmes & Mathews, 2010; Marks, 
Franklin, & Zoellner, 2018). The experience of highly distressing or traumatic events can not 
only result in the development of intrusive memories, but may also be critically involved in 
the development of dysfunctional beliefs (or schemas) about the self, others and the world, 
which are at the heart of many emotional disorders (e.g., Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Young, Klosko, & Weishaar, 2003). Moreover, 
memories of highly distressing or traumatic events may be linked to problematic emotional 
and physiological responding to the event memory itself, but also to situations that remind 
individuals of the original experience. In order to avoid distress associated with the activation 
of the aversive memories, individuals often use maladaptive behavioral strategies such as 
avoidance, safety behavior, and withdrawal (e.g., Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Foa, Steketee, & 
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Rothbaum, 1989; Hackmann et al., 2000). In order to reduce symptoms linked to aversive 
autobiographical memories, imagery-based therapeutic interventions have been increasingly 
integrated in cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) across emotional disorders (Edwards, 2007; 
Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). One of these imagery-based techniques is imagery 
rescripting (ImRs), a promising treatment strategy that in recent years has gained growing 
interest in clinical research and practice. 
 
 
Imagery rescripting as a transdiagnostic treatment approach for aversive memories  
ImRs is an imagery-based therapeutic technique to target aversive autobiographical 
memories in emotional disorders (e.g., Arntz, 2012; Holmes et al., 2007). By changing 
negative memories into more positive mental images, ImRs aims to update the idiosyncratic 
meaning of the original event thereby reducing recurrent intrusive images, dysfunctional 
beliefs, and negative emotions (Arntz, 2012; Morina, Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). ImRs has 
originally been developed to reduce symptoms associated with traumatic childhood memories 
(Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 1995). However, in recent 
years, various forms of ImRs have been incorporated in CBT for a number of emotional 
disorders such as PTSD (e.g., Arntz, Tiesma, & Kindt, 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & 
Christianson, 2007; Øktedalen, Hoffart, & Langkaas, 2015; Raabe, Ehring, Marquenie, Olff, 
& Kindt, 2015), SAD (e.g., Hyett et al., 2018; Lee & Kwon, 2013; McEvoy & Saulsman, 
2014; Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; 
Wild & Clark, 2011), depression (e.g., Brewin et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2018), personality 
disorders (e.g., Arntz, 2011; Weertman & Arntz, 2007), and nightmare disorder (e.g., Kunze, 
Arntz, Morina, Kindt, & Lancee, 2017).  
Although different treatment protocols have been proposed (for an overview, see e.g., 
Holmes et al., 2007), all ImRs variants share the common goal to emotionally activate 
memory-related mental images and to change the negative mental images into more benign 
ones according to the individual’s personal needs (Arntz, 2012; Holmes at al., 2007). The 
present thesis primarily focused on the protocol developed by Arntz and Weertman (1999) for 
the treatment of traumatic childhood memories. According to this protocol, ImRs is delivered 
in three phases (see Table 1.1): During Phase 1, the patient re-experiences the original 
aversive scene from the child’s perspective. During Phase 2, patients imagine themselves to 
enter the mental image as an adult. The adult self is encouraged to observe what is happening 
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to the child and to intervene, for example by disempowering the perpetrator, confronting 
others, and saving and/or supporting the child. During Phase 3, patients are instructed to again 
re-experience the scene from the child’s perspective, but this time including the interventions 
by the adult. Furthermore, patients are encouraged to verbalize from the child’s perspective 
any further actions or unmet needs that he/she requires from the adult self (e.g., emotional 
support, distraction).  
 
 
 
Table 1.1. Basic model of imagery rescripting by Arntz & Weertman (1999) 
Phase Perspective Aim Description 
1 Child Emotional activation The patient re-experiences the original 
aversive scene. 
2 Adult Rescripting The patient views the scene from an adult 
perspective and intervenes. 
3 Child Rescripting The interventions by the adult self are 
experienced by the patient from a child 
perspective. Patient as a child receives further 
interventions and/or emotional support from 
the adult self. 
 
 
 
Findings from a recent meta-analysis have shown that ImRs interventions are effective 
in reducing psychopathology related to distressing memories in different disorders, including 
PTSD, SAD, depression, bulimia nervosa, body dysmorphic disorder, and obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Morina et al., 2017), thereby underlining its potential as a 
transdiagnostic treatment approach. With an average of 4.5 sessions, ImRs yielded large pre- 
to posttreatment effect sizes (Hedge’s g = 1.22). However, limitations of the meta-analysis are 
that only PTSD (8 studies) and SAD (6 studies) were relatively well represented and that 
ImRs was delivered in combination with other interventions in some of the studies (Morina et 
al., 2017). Randomized controlled trials with adequate statistical power are still needed for a 
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number of disorders. Additionally, studies comparing ImRs as a stand-alone intervention with 
well-established CBT interventions are required. Preliminary evidence indicates that ImRs 
might be as effective as imaginal exposure treatment for PTSD (Øktedalen et al., 2015) and 
cognitive restructuring (CR) for SAD patients (Norton & Abbott, 2016). Moreover, ImRs 
might be superior to imaginal exposure in targeting non-fear emotions such as guilt, shame, 
and anger (Arntz et al., 2007; Grunert et al. 2007; but see also Øktedalen et al., 2015). Finally, 
when compared to prolonged exposure, ImRs has been perceived as a more tolerable 
alternative (for patients and therapists) thereby possibly leading to lower drop-out rates (Arntz 
et al., 2007). 
In sum, ImRs can be considered a promising transdiagnostic treatment approach. 
However, until now little is known about its working mechanisms. A number of different 
ImRs protocols have been developed for different emotional disorders (e.g., Arntz & 
Weertman, 1999; Smucker et al., 1995; Wild & Clark, 2011) and for the purpose of 
experimental research in analogue settings (e.g., Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012; Seebauer, Froß, 
Dubaschny, Schönberger, & Jacob, 2014; Tolgou et al., 2018; Watson, Rapee, & Todorov, 
2016). In order to answer the question how ImRs is most effectively delivered, it is crucial to 
understand the mechanisms underlying its treatment effects (Kazdin, 2009).  
 
 
Working mechanisms of imagery rescripting  
Research into the working mechanisms of ImRs is only in its infancy – or as noted by 
Arntz: “ImRs, although a powerful technique, seems to be a technique in need of a theory” 
(Arntz 2012, p. 200). It has been suggested that ImRs works by activating and revaluating the 
memory of the original event, which is then stored with a less negative meaning (Arntz, 
2012). Meanings of current threat, for example, might be modified by changing mental 
images of the original aversive situation into more positive images of the individual being 
safe and protected. Perceiving control over what is happening in the aversive memory might 
(re-)establish a sense of mastery or self-efficacy and reduce beliefs about uncontrollability 
and the self being incompetent. Dysfunctional appraisals about the self being helpless, 
worthless or a bad person might be revaluated by rescripting the memory in a way that the 
traumatized self gets protection, support, and comfort by the adult self or another person (see 
e.g., Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Hackmann, 2011). By changing the dysfunctional meaning of 
one specific memory of an autobiographical event (“memory revaluation”), ImRs is suggested 
General Introduction 
16 
to decrease memory-related emotional distress as well as (more generalized) memory-derived 
dysfunctional beliefs (Arntz, 2012). Importantly, however, ImRs is not assumed to yield 
symptomatic change by modifying factual details of the distressing event-memory (see 
Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012; Siegesleitner, Strohm, Wittekind, Ehring & Kunze, 2019a). 
Preliminary evidence from laboratory-based studies using film-induced memories supports 
the notion that ImRs leads to a revaluation of the negative valence of memory representations 
(Dibbets & Arntz 2016; Dibbets, Lemmens, & Voncken, 2018; Hagenaars & Arntz 2012). 
Further evidence for this working mechanism stems from studies in SAD demonstrating that 
ImRs reduces negative meanings, emotions, and distress associated with memory retrieval of 
aversive social experiences (Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). Findings from 
a study in patients with idiopathic nightmare disorder indicate that ImRs might specifically 
work by enhancing perceived mastery of nightmare contents (Kunze, Lancee, Morina, Kindt, 
& Arntz, 2019). Although this preliminary evidence indicates that ImRs might modify 
dysfunctional meanings of aversive memory representations as well as memory-related 
emotional responses, it needs to be tested whether results for film-induced memories and 
nightmare contents generalize to memory contents of distressing real-life experiences. 
Moreover, in addition to subjective self-report measures, an investigation of physiological 
processes may significantly contribute to a better understanding of mechanisms underlying 
ImRs. If the intervention indeed changes the dysfunctional meaning of memory 
representations of highly distressing or traumatic events this should result in reduced 
physiological responding to memory retrieval (Arntz, 2012; see also Foa et al., 1989). 
However, it has not been investigated yet whether ImRs reduces the physiological reactivity 
to autobiographical memories of real-life events.  
In the context of SAD research, an alternative (but related) mechanism has been 
proposed to underlie ImRs, namely emotionally anchored reappraisal of memory-related 
beliefs (Nilsson et al., 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Wild et al., 2008). During ImRs, 
corrective information is provided in the form of mental images. Significant overlap has been 
found in brain areas involved in mental imagery and the perception of equivalent real-life 
events (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). In line with these findings, mental images of personal 
experiences appear to have a powerful impact on emotions (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). 
Given the special link between imagery and emotions, it has been suggested that alternative 
meanings offered in the form of images might be more emotionally anchored and more 
believable than meanings that are generated as verbal representations (Holmes & Mathews, 
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2010). In other words, ImRs might change meaning representations on an implicational level 
(“knowing with the heart”), while verbal-cognitive treatment strategies (e.g., CR) are assumed 
to change beliefs on a propositional level (“knowing with the head”; see Model of Interacting 
Cognitive Subsystems, Barnard & Teasdale, 1991). For clinical practice, this hypothesized 
treatment mechanisms appears to be highly relevant, as ImRs might be more effective 
compared to CR if it indeed facilitates emotionally anchored reappraisal. Preliminary 
evidence has shown that ImRs reduces dysfunctional emotional beliefs (i.e., meaning 
representations on the implicational level) in patients with bulimia nervosa (Cooper, Todd, & 
Turner, 2007). However, more systematic investigations are needed to answer the question 
whether these results generalize to ImRs in other emotional disorders (e.g., SAD) and whether 
ImRs is indeed superior to cognitive interventions in fostering emotionally anchored 
reappraisal. 
 
 
Laboratory-based approaches to investigate working mechanisms of imagery rescripting  
In order to investigate mechanisms involved in psychological treatments, laboratory-
based research in healthy samples can be considered a valuable means. By modeling 
psychopathological processes and their treatment in healthy samples, analogue research 
paradigms allow systematic investigations of treatment mechanisms in a highly controlled and 
standardized setting (for reviews, see Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; Van 
den Hout, Engelhard, & McNally, 2017; Vervliet & Raes, 2013). Moreover, laboratory-based 
studies in analogue samples are usually more cost-effective and less time-consuming when 
compared to clinical studies. In the context of ImRs, laboratory-based research has mainly 
used aversive films to induce distressing memories, which were then targeted by ImRs (e.g., 
Dibbets & Arntz 2016; Dibbets et al., 2018; Hagenaars & Arntz 2012; Kunze, Arntz, & Kindt, 
2019; Seebauer et al., 2014). However, importantly, ecological validity of the trauma film 
paradigm (TFP) is limited, as film-induced memories lack personal relevance for the 
individual, do typically not encapsulate negative idiosyncratic meanings about the self and do 
usually not evoke non-fear emotions such as guilt or shame, which are highly relevant in a 
number of patient populations (e.g., Beck et al., 2011; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011; 
Lee, Scragg, & Turner, 2001). Moreover, in this previous analogue research ImRs 
interventions did not involve the rescripting of autobiographical memories of real-life 
experiences, in which participants had been actively involved in. In order to overcome these 
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limitations the present thesis aims to develop and evaluate alternative analogue research 
approaches to investigate mechanisms underlying ImRs under highly controlled conditions. 
Aiming to enhance the ecological validity, ImRs is examined in the context of 
autobiographical memories of distressing real-life experiences.  
 
 
Aims of the present thesis  
The aim of the present thesis is to shed light on the mechanisms underlying ImRs as a 
transdiagnostic treatment approach for aversive autobiographical memories and associated 
symptoms. In order to overcome limitations of previous laboratory research using the TFP, an 
analogue paradigm to study ImRs in autobiographical memories of distressing real-life events 
is presented and tested in Study I. Moreover, Study I involves a preliminary examination of 
potential working mechanisms of ImRs by testing whether ImRs reduces subjective emotional 
responding to the memory and enhances perceived mastery of aversive events. Based on the 
findings of Study I, Study II aims to optimize the analogue paradigm by integrating 
physiological assessments in addition to self-report measures. The aim of Study II is to 
replicate findings of Study I on subjective outcomes (emotional responding; perceived 
mastery) using an additional active control condition (positive imagery strategy) and to extend 
findings by examining whether ImRs attenuates the physiological reactivity to aversive 
autobiographical memories. Finally, Study III addresses limitations of Studies I and II by 
examining ImRs in a subclinical sample of highly socially anxious individuals who report 
higher levels of baseline-symptoms and idiosyncratic dysfunctional self-beliefs. Moreover, 
ImRs is compared to an active treatment condition (i.e., CR). Study III aims to replicate 
previous evidence on the stand-alone effects of one session of ImRs versus CR for social 
anxiety and to test whether ImRs works through emotionally anchored reappraisal of 
memory-related dysfunctional beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Study I: 
 
Imagery Rescripting of Aversive Autobiographical Memories: Effects on 
Memory Distress, Emotions, and Feelings of Mastery 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Cognitive 
Therapy and Research: 
 
Strohm, M., Siegesleitner, M., Kunze, A. E., Ehring, T., & Wittekind, C. E. (2019). Imagery 
Rescripting of aversive autobiographical memories: Effects on memory distress, emotions, 
and feelings of mastery. Cognitive Therapy and Research. Advance online publication.  
 
The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10608-019-
10021-2 
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Abstract 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) has been shown to be a promising intervention for aversive 
emotional memories, but research on underlying mechanisms is only in its beginnings. 
Previous analogue studies on ImRs were mainly based on the trauma film paradigm, but the 
personal relevance of film-induced memories is limited. Therefore, the present study aimed to 
investigate the effects of ImRs on personally relevant autobiographical memories. Sixty-five 
participants who had experienced a distressing life-event were randomly assigned to ImRs or 
no-intervention control (NIC). ImRs led to less intrusive memories than NIC during the 1-
week follow-up period, but was not superior in reducing overall event-related stress 
symptoms. When retrieving the memory after one week, ImRs participants reported greater 
reductions in sadness and distress, and higher feelings of mastery. Findings underline the 
potential of the paradigm used in this study to test memory processes involved in ImRs. 
Limitations and modifications of the paradigm are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) has been shown to be a promising intervention for disorders 
associated with aversive emotional memories (Arntz, 2012; Morina, Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). 
ImRs is applied transdiagnostically to reduce distressing intrusive images, negative emotions, 
and dysfunctional beliefs by activating an aversive memory in imagination and then changing 
the imagined situation according to the individual’s emotional needs (Arntz, 2012; Holmes, 
Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). For example, a patient with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
might rescript negative mental images of the traumatic event into more benign ones by 
imagining that he or she successfully disempowers the perpetrator and then gets emotional 
support by others (Arntz, 2011; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Although there is growing 
evidence for the efficacy of ImRs in different disorders (Arntz, 2012; Morina et al., 2017), 
research into the underlying mechanisms is only in its infancy. Or as stated by Arntz: “ImRs, 
although a powerful technique, seems to be a technique in need of a theory” (Arntz, 2012, p. 
200). A deeper understanding of the mechanisms underlying ImRs will be essential to 
optimize its treatment effects (Kazdin, 2009).  
In addition to clinical studies, laboratory-based studies in healthy individuals have been 
proven a suitable means to systematically investigate underlying mechanisms of 
psychological treatments (for reviews, see Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; 
van den Hout, Engelhard, & McNally, 2017). In these analogue paradigms, both etiological 
models and treatment processes can be examined under highly controlled and standardized 
conditions and in a more cost-effective and less time-consuming way (Scheveneels et al., 
2016; Vervliet & Raes, 2013). Past analogue studies investigating ImRs were mainly based on 
the trauma film paradigm (TFP; for reviews, see Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016). 
In these studies, aversive film material was presented to induce emotional memories and 
ImRs was used to modify these memories and/or associated stress symptoms (e.g., Dibbets & 
Arntz, 2016; Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012; Seebauer, Froß, Dubaschny, Schönberger, & Jacob, 
2014). However, some important limitations of the TFP have to be considered in the context 
of ImRs research:  
Within the TFP there is a lack of personal relevance of the induced emotional memory. 
While watching stressful films, participants are in a passive third person perspective, 
observing aversive events on a screen instead of being actually involved in them. Participants 
in recent TFP studies reported that they had been constantly aware that it is “only” a film, thus 
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experiencing high levels of control (Dibbets & Arntz, 2016; Dibbets & Schulte-Ostermann, 
2015). Personal relevance of film-induced memories is also restricted by the fact that aversive 
film contents do not affect the individual’s life to the same extent as real-life experiences 
(e.g., impact on relationships, on the image of the self, on longer-term emotionality, 
cognitions, etc.). Consequently, film-induced memories differ importantly from emotional 
memories usually targeted with ImRs in clinical practice. As ImRs aims not only to change 
negative images of the aversive event, but also targets negative meanings and beliefs about 
the self (Holmes et al., 2007; Wild & Clark, 2011), it appears crucial to examine ImRs in the 
context of personally relevant memories.  
Furthermore, analogue symptoms induced within the TFP are typically short-lived 
(Arnaudova & Hagenaars, 2017; James et al., 2016). In the context of ImRs research the 
majority of TFP studies have focused on intrusive memories as main outcome. However, the 
number of intrusive memories related to film contents usually declines rapidly within the first 
days after viewing the film, even without any intervention (e.g., James et al., 2015). This 
leads to floor effects that make it difficult to investigate the modulation of intrusive memories 
by therapeutic strategies. Additionally, as ImRs is used in several disorders to target not only 
intrusive memories but a wider range of psychopathological problems (Arntz, 2012), 
analogue paradigms are needed in which intervention effects on different types of symptoms 
can be modelled.  
Finally, it remains questionable whether memories associated with non-fear emotions 
like anger, guilt, or shame can be induced using aversive films (Dibbets & Arntz, 2016). In 
light of recent findings that ImRs might be superior to exposure-based interventions in 
targeting non-fear emotions (Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & 
Christianson, 2007), analogue paradigms in the context of ImRs research should allow an 
examination of these emotions.  
In order to address the outlined limitations of the TFP, the present study tests an 
analogue paradigm which investigates ImRs in autobiographical memories of distressing 
real-life events (for similar approaches in the context of Eye Movement Desensitisation and 
Reprocessing, see e.g., van den Hout, Muris, Salemink, & Kindt, 2001). Thus, we aimed to 
provide a paradigm which allows exploring mechanisms underlying ImRs in the context of 
personally relevant memories, which are associated with a larger range of emotions and more 
persistent stress reactions in daily life than film-induced memories. 
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It has been suggested that one mechanism underlying ImRs might be that it changes the 
meaning of the memory representation of aversive events, thereby reducing the strong 
negative emotional response to the memory (Arntz, 2012). This idea is in accordance with 
growing evidence that memories can be changed when first reactivated and then re-evaluated 
during the process of reconsolidation (for reviews on memory reconsolidation interference, 
see Beckers & Kindt, 2017; Schwabe, Nader, & Pruessner, 2014). Recent lab studies provide 
preliminary evidence that ImRs indeed changes the meaning of memory representations of 
aversive (film/picture) stimuli and reduces associated negative emotional responses as well as 
intrusion development (Dibbets & Arntz, 2016; Dibbets, Poort, & Arntz, 2012; Hagenaars & 
Arntz, 2012). However, in these studies ImRs was examined during the process of memory 
formation, i.e. during consolidation, as ImRs was employed on the same day of film/picture 
presentation. Only a limited number of studies have investigated the effects of ImRs on 
emotional responses to already consolidated autobiographical memories when these memories 
are retrieved again after the intervention (e.g., Cili, Pettit, & Stopa, 2016; Slofstra, Nauta, 
Holmes, & Bockting, 2016). An investigation of consolidated memories is arguably more 
relevant from a clinical perspective, given that ImRs is usually applied as a therapeutic 
treatment method rather than a preventive strategy. Findings by Çili et al. (2016) showed that 
ImRs reduces negative affect and distress in a non-clinical sample when retrieving aversive 
autobiographical memories, but due to the lack of a control condition it remains unclear 
whether changes were produced solely by the intervention. In social anxiety disorder, ImRs 
has been found to decrease negative emotions and distress elicited by memories of aversive 
social experiences when compared with no intervention control conditions (Nilsson, Lundh, 
& Viborg, 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). In a series of experiments by Slofstra et al. 
(2016) different ImRs variations were compared, but for Conceptual-ImRs (i.e., changing 
meaning-relevant memory content as done in clinical practice) no consistent effects on the 
unpleasantness and emotionality (anxiety, sadness, helplessness) of autobiographical 
memories were found. As the effects of ImRs (and the control tasks) were assessed in a 
within-subject design immediately after the interventions, no conclusions about longer-term 
outcomes can be drawn from this study. In sum, there is first evidence for the notion that 
ImRs changes the meaning of aversive memory representations and the associated emotional 
response (Çili et al., 2016; Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015), but replications 
in controlled study designs examining longer-term effects (e.g., when retrieving the memory 
several days after the intervention) are clearly needed. 
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It has been further proposed that ImRs works through enhancing feelings of mastery 
(Kunze, Lancee, Morina, Kindt, & Arntz, 2016). During ImRs, the individual is empowered 
to actively change mental images of aversive experiences and to express action tendencies 
that have been inhibited in the original situation (Arntz, 2012). This may not only help to 
increase perceived mastery over intrusive images (Germain, 2004; Long & Quevillon, 2009), 
but also modify maladaptive beliefs about mastery of aversive events. First evidence for the 
notion that ImRs works through increasing feelings of mastery (of the nightmare content) 
stems from a recent study in patients with nightmare disorder (Kunze, Lancee, Morina, Kindt, 
& Arntz, 2019). However, it remains an open question whether ImRs equally enhances 
feelings of mastery of aversive experiences when used as a treatment strategy for individuals 
who have experienced distressing life-events.   
 The aims of the present study were twofold. First, the study aimed to evaluate the 
usefulness of an adapted analogue paradigm for the investigation of ImRs in aversive 
autobiographical memories. In a two-day procedure, healthy individuals who had experienced 
an aversive life-event and who still felt distressed by this event in daily life were randomly 
allocated to ImRs or a no-intervention control condition (NIC). Levels of stress 
symptomatology were assessed at baseline and at 1-week follow-up; intrusion frequency in 
daily life was additionally measured during the week after the intervention. The memory of 
the life-event was reactivated before the intervention and at 1-week follow-up to assess 
memory-related processes. In order to evaluate the paradigm, we tested whether stress 
symptoms associated with the aversive life-events can be modified using ImRs. Based on the 
efficacy of ImRs in clinical samples, we expected ImRs to be superior to NIC in reducing 
event-related stress symptoms (i.e., intrusions, avoidance, hyperarousal; Hypothesis 1) as well 
as intrusion frequency in daily life (Hypothesis 2). The second aim of this study was a 
preliminary examination of mechanisms possibly underlying ImRs by investigating (1) 
whether ImRs changes the emotional response to consolidated autobiographical memories and 
(2) enhances feelings of mastery of aversive events. Specifically, we hypothesized that 
participants receiving ImRs would report significantly greater reductions of distress 
(Hypothesis 3) as well as fear and negative non-fear emotions (Hypothesis 4) in response to 
memory reactivation (baseline to 1-week follow-up) compared to NIC. We expected ImRs to 
be superior to NIC in enhancing feelings of mastery (Hypothesis 5). To explore the short-term 
impact of the ImRs intervention on affect and distress, we conducted several exploratory 
analyses on the immediate pre- to post-intervention effects. 
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Method 
Participants  
Individuals who had experienced a distressing life-event in the past 24 months (e.g., 
relationship break-up, job loss, interpersonal conflicts) and still felt distressed by this event 
were recruited via advertisements on campus at LMU Munich and via social media. In session 
1, a short structured interview (developed for the purpose of this study) was administered in 
order to assess the following event-related a priori inclusion criteria: (1) experience of a 
distressing but non-traumatic event (according to criterion A of DSM-5, American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013) within the past 24 months, (2) recurrent distressing memories of the event 
during the last week in the form of (a) intrusive thoughts or images, (b) nightmares or (c) 
emotional/physical responding to reminders of the event, (3) at least moderate distress at the 
time the event happened (rating of at least 50 on a 0-100 scale, ranging from not at all 
distressed to extremely distressed), and (4) levels of distress at the time of study participation 
of at least 30 (on the same 0 – 100 scale). Death of a close person was excluded as distressing 
life-event due to ethical concerns that study participation after a recent loss may disturb the 
natural mourning process. The following exclusion criteria were assessed using the German 
version of the Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview for DSM-IV (M.I.N.I 5.0.0; 
Sheehan et al., 1998; German version: Ackenheil, Stotz-Ingenlath, Dietz-Bauer, & Vossen, 
1999) and a short screening interview: (1) current diagnosis of a mental disorder, (2) acute 
suicidal tendencies, (3) lifetime diagnosis of PTSD/ psychotic disorder/ bipolar disorder, (4) 
psychological treatment at the time of study participation, (5) severe physical illness, (6) 
pregnancy, and (7) age below 18 or above 30 years. These exclusion criteria were defined for 
ethical reasons (Criteria 1 – 6: concern that study participation may lead to higher emotional 
distress in potentially vulnerable individuals) and in order to ensure homogeneity of the study 
sample regarding age (Criterion 7). 
A total of 103 participants were recruited, 35 of which had to be excluded (n = 16 
current or lifetime diagnosis of mental disorder; n = 16 did not meet inclusion criteria 
regarding the life-event; n = 3 were aged > 30). In addition, three participants did not attend 
the follow-up session and were therefore excluded from data analyses
1
.  
 
___________________________________ 
1
One of these participants withdrew their consent for the study and therefore no data is available. When 
including the remaining two participants in analyses of Session 1 (manipulation check and exploratory analyses) 
results remained unchanged.  
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The final sample comprised 65 students (81.5% female; age: M = 22.65, SD = 2.90). All gave 
written informed consent and were reimbursed by receiving either 25€ or partial course credit. 
The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Psychology at LMU 
Munich. 
 
 
Tasks 
Memory reactivation task 
The memory reactivation task was developed for the purpose of this study. The aim of 
this task was to reactivate the emotional memory in both experimental conditions and during 
both sessions so that reactions to memory retrieval (memory distress, negative emotions, 
mastery) could be assessed (see Hypotheses 3-5). In order to get a specific memory for the 
memory reactivation task (which was important in the case of longer lasting life-events or 
repeating aversive events), participants were first asked to specify the concrete situation (or 
“scene”) of their distressing life-event that they most frequently re-experienced in their 
intrusive memories. This procedure was chosen to determine the most relevant intrusive 
memory. For memory reactivation, participants were then instructed to provide a detailed 3-5 
min description of this specific aversive memory. The experimenter supported the description 
with active listening. Only in case participants stopped the narrative or did not talk about the 
actual event-memory, experimenters asked questions to stimulate a more detailed description 
or to come back to the memory. When participants were about to exceed the pre-defined time-
window, they were encouraged to conclude their description, but were not immediately 
interrupted. Subsequently, the hotspot was determined by asking participants for the most 
distressing moment while talking about the aversive memory. The experimenter made a note 
of the specific memory that was used for the memory reactivation task in Session 1 to ensure 
that the same memory was reactivated in Session 2.  
 
Filler task 
Based on the assumption that ImRs may work through memory updating processes 
during reconsolidation (Arntz, 2012), memory reactivation was followed by a 10-min 
standardized music filler task as used in James et al. (2015) to allow enough time for possible 
memory reconsolidation processes to be initiated before the intervention started. The specific 
duration of the filler task is based on previous studies targeting reconsolidation update 
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mechanisms in humans (James et al., 2015; Schiller et al., 2010). Participants were presented 
excerpts of classical music which they rated for pleasantness.  
 
 
Experimental conditions 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) 
The ImRs procedure was developed based on the protocol by Arntz and Weertman 
(1999), but with major adaptions with respect to the phases of the imagery exercise (as life-
events had happened recently, participants were not instructed to experience the event from 
the adult’s and the child’s perspective). The intervention protocol was semi-structured with 
standardized instructions and questions, which could vary in order depending on the 
individual rescripting process. Experimenters were extensively trained and supervised during 
the study by the first author. 
Before ImRs started, the experimenter gave a short demonstration of an imagery 
exercise (description of a regular day’s breakfast), but no rationale was provided. For the 
ImRs intervention, participants were then encouraged to close their eyes and to vividly 
imagine the previously defined aversive memory (see “Memory reactivation task” section). 
Participants were instructed to describe their experiences out loud from the first person 
perspective, in present tense, and including all sensory modalities. The following questions 
were asked to support participants (see Arntz & Weertman, 1999): What happens? What do 
you see/ hear/ smell? What do you feel? What is going through your mind? This first phase of 
the ImRs procedure (affective activation; duration: M = 3.87 min, SD = 1.84) was used to 
reactivate emotions related to the memory and included the individual hotspot. The second 
phase of ImRs (rescripting of the memory; duration: M = 13.81 min, SD = 4.38) started 
immediately after the hotspot and was initiated by instructing participants to change the 
“script of the scene” in any desired way to make it less distressing. Changes could be realistic 
or unrealistic (with the exception of undoing what has happened before and during the hotspot 
of the memory; see Dibbets & Arntz, 2016). Participants were asked to vividly imagine the 
new script and to describe it in detail to the experimenter (starting immediately after the 
hotspot, not at the beginning of the scene). The following questions were asked to support the 
rescripting (see Arntz & Weertman, 1999): What would you like to do/say? Ok, do it/say it! 
What do you feel? What do you think? Is there anything else you would like to change? Is 
there anything (else) you need? When participants felt fully satisfied with the new outcome 
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and did not wish to apply further changes to the script, they were encouraged to conclude the 
ImRs procedure by dwelling on the final positive image for a moment. 
 
No intervention control condition (NIC) 
The no-intervention control condition consisted of a 20-min break. Participants spent 
the time waiting alone in the laboratory and were provided some selected magazines. The 
control group was used to control for time effects (e.g., spontaneous recovery) and for 
unintended beneficial effects of the experimental procedure (e.g., placebo effects caused by 
mere study participation, assessment reactivity). 
 
 
Measures 
Event-related stress symptoms 
Stress symptoms in response to the distressing life-event were assessed using the Impact 
of Event Scale-Revised (IES-R; Weiss & Marmar, 1997; German version: Maercker & 
Schützwohl, 1998). The IES-R is a 22-item self-report questionnaire measuring posttraumatic 
symptoms over the past seven days on three subscales: intrusions, avoidance, and 
hyperarousal. Based on the original English version of the IES-R (Weiss & Marmar, 1997), 
we used a 5-point response-scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). Participants 
were explicitly instructed to answer items with respect to their distressing life-event. 
 
Intrusive memories 
A short questionnaire was administered at baseline in order to assess intrusive memories 
of the life-event during the past week. Participants were asked to indicate the number and the 
type of their intrusions (images, thoughts, or combination of images and thoughts) as well as 
associated distress (on a scale ranging from 0 [not at all distressed] to 10 [extremely 
distressed]).  
The number of intrusions during the week following the intervention were measured via 
a smartphone app (movisensXS), which was based on frequently used paper pencil intrusion 
diaries (e.g., Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy, 2004; James et al., 2015). Intrusive memories 
were defined as images or thoughts of the life-event that occur spontaneously and non-
deliberately (this definition was provided verbally as well as in written form in the 
questionnaire and in the smartphone app). Participants were instructed to carry the 
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smartphone with them all day and to open the app immediately when an intrusive memory 
occurred. The app then asked for the content of the intrusion, the situation that triggered the 
intrusion, and the type of intrusion (image, thought, or combination of image and thought). To 
enhance compliance, participants received a message every evening asking them to fill in 
every intrusion that they had not reported on that same day. Intrusive memories recorded via 
the app were rated by two independent raters (both blind to experimental condition) using the 
following categories: (1) intrusive memories of the distressing life-event itself (i.e., of the 
aversive memory targeted in the study), (2) intrusive memories, which are related to the life-
event, but have not explicitly been targeted during study participation (e.g., intrusive 
memories of past situations with the ex-partner, but not of the break-up itself), (3) intrusive 
memories of positive images of the ImRs, (4) no intrusive memory (e.g., rumination). 
Interrater agreement was satisfactory (κ = .74). In case of disagreement, ratings were 
discussed by the two raters to reach a consensus. In accordance with our hypotheses only 
intrusive memories of category (1) and (2) were included in data analyses. We analyzed 
intrusions of the two categories separately in order to detect differential effects.  
 
Distress  
Subjectively experienced levels of event-related distress were assessed before and after 
the intervention as well as after the memory reactivation task using Subjective Units of 
Distress (SUD) on a 100-mm visual analogue scale ranging from 0 (not at all distressed) to 
100 (extremely distressed).  
 
Negative emotions  
Six 100-mm visual analogue scales (VAS) ranging from 0 (not at all intense) to 100 
(extremely intense) were administered for one fear emotion (anxiety) and five distinct non-
fear emotions (anger, sadness, shame, guilt, and disgust) to assess emotional reactions in 
response to the memory reactivation task. The emotions were always presented in the same 
order (as listed above). 
 
Mastery 
Mastery was assessed after the memory reactivation tasks and was operationalized as 
perceived ability to control the aversive situation of the distressing life-event. Participants 
were asked verbally to rate their feelings of mastery regarding the aversive situation in their 
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memory (“How controllable do you experience the situation that you just described to me, on 
a scale ranging from 0 [not at all controllable] to 100 [very controllable]?”).     
 
Positive and negative affect  
Changes in positive and negative affect in response to ImRs were measured 
immediately before and after the intervention (and NIC) using the Positive and Negative 
Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; German version: Krohne, 
Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996).  
 
 
Procedure  
The study comprised two sessions (conducted by the same experimenter), which were 
exactly one week apart. For an overview of the study procedure see Figure 2.1.  
 
Session 1 
Participants were administered the diagnostic interviews to check for inclusion and 
exclusion criteria, followed by baseline measures (t0: sociodemographic data, IES-R, 
intrusion questionnaire, PANAS, SUD, VAS negative emotions). Next, the memory 
reactivation task was administered, followed by memory ratings (t1: SUD, VAS negative 
emotions, mastery) and the filler task. Participants then filled out pre-treatment questionnaires 
(t2: SUD, PANAS) and were randomly allocated to ImRs (n = 31) or NIC (n = 34). 
Immediately after the intervention (or NIC), participants completed post-treatment measures 
(t3: SUD, PANAS) and were provided with verbal and written instructions on the nature of 
intrusive memories and the correct usage of the intrusion diary. 
 
Session 2 
Participants first filled in the follow-up questionnaire (t4: IES-R). Then, the aversive 
memory was reactivated using the same reactivation task as in Session 1 followed by memory 
ratings (t5: SUD, VAS negative emotions, mastery). Finally, participants were fully debriefed 
and NIC participants were offered to receive the ImRs intervention in an additional session 
for ethical reasons.  
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Statistical analyses 
A manipulation check was performed to test effects of the memory reactivation task on 
subjective distress and negative emotions in both groups: For SUD ratings as dependent 
variable, a repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) was conducted with Time (t0 
vs. t1) as within-subject factor and Condition (ImRs vs. NIC) as between-subjects factor. For 
the six negative emotions, a 2(t0 vs. t1) x 2(ImRs vs. NIC) repeated measures multivariate 
analysis of variance (MANOVA) was carried out. Significant multivariate effects were 
followed up with separate ANOVAs on each emotion.  
In order to test whether ImRs led to a greater reduction of event-related stress symptoms 
than NIC, 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with Time (t0 vs. t4) as within-subjects factor 
and Condition (ImRs vs. NIC) as between-subjects factor were carried out for the three 
subscales of the IES-R. Mann-Whitney U-tests were calculated to examine group differences 
between ImRs and NIC in intrusion frequency during the 1-week follow-up, given the 
positively skewed distribution of this variable. Effects of ImRs on memory distress, negative 
emotions and mastery were examined with separate 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVAs with 
Time (t1 vs. t5) as within-subjects factor and Condition (ImRs vs. NIC) as between-subjects 
factor. To explore pre-post-effects of ImRs on affect and distress, a series of 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVAs with Time (t2 vs. t3) as within-subjects factor and Condition (ImRs vs. 
NIC) as between-subjects factor were conducted. 
A significance level of α = .05 (two-tailed) was used for all analyses. One participant 
reported an implausibly high number of intrusions at baseline (100 intrusions during the past 
week), but was still included in analyses for Hypothesis 2, as results remained unchanged 
excluding this participant. Due to an interruption during the experimental procedure before 
post-treatment measurement, one participant of the ImRs group was not included in the 
exploratory analyses (pre vs. post effects).  
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Power analysis 
Based on the main hypotheses regarding the effects of ImRs on event-related stress symptoms 
and reactions to memory reactivation, a sample-size calculation was run for the Time x 
Condition interaction effects (2x2 repeated measures ANOVA: within-between interaction, α 
= .05, power = .80, run with G*Power 3.1). A sample size of 32 per group was required to 
detect small to medium interaction effects
2
 (f = 0.18). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
2
As this is (to the best of our knowledge) the first controlled study investigating longer-term effects of ImRs on 
distressing autobiographical memories in a non-clinical sample, the assumed effect sizes could not be based on 
previously reported findings. We conservatively adjusted large effect sizes from clinical ImRs-studies (Morina et 
al., 2017) to small to medium effect sizes for our study.   
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Results 
Participant characteristics and baseline comparisons  
Participants’ demographic characteristics, baseline measures as well as characteristics 
of the distressing life-events are provided in Table 2.1. There were no significant differences 
between ImRs and NIC in any of the measures. Baseline scores of outcome measures can be 
derived from Table 2.2. At baseline (t0) no significant differences between groups emerged 
on IES-R, PANAS, and SUD, all ps > .386.  
 
 
Manipulation check: Effects of memory reactivation  
As a manipulation check, we tested whether the memory reactivation led to the 
expected increase of subjective distress and negative emotions: The 2 (t0 vs. t1) x 2 (ImRs vs. 
NIC) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Time with an overall 
increase in subjective distress (SUD) from pre- to post-memory reactivation, F(1, 63) = 91.01, 
p < .001, η²p = .59. No significant main effect of Condition and no significant interaction 
emerged, all Fs(1, 63) < 0.55, ps > .460 , η²p < .009. Results of a 2 (t0 vs. t1) x 2 (ImRs vs. 
NIC) repeated measures MANOVA with the six negative emotions (anxiety, anger, sadness, 
shame, guilt, disgust) as dependent variables revealed a significant main effect of Time, F(6, 
58) = 13.22, p < .001, η²p = .58. Neither the main effect of Condition, nor the interaction effect 
were significant, all Fs(6, 58) < 0.37, ps > .897, η²p < .037. Separate univariate ANOVAs 
showed that there was an increase in all negative emotions over time, all Fs(1, 63) > 7.56, ps 
< .008, η²p > .11, irrespective of condition. Nevertheless, mean levels of anxiety, anger, 
shame, guilt, and disgust were found to be still low after memory reactivation with 50% of the 
sample scoring under 20 on a 0-100 scale (see Figure A.1 in the Supplementary Material). As 
a consequence, only sadness was included as dependent variable in the main analysis as it 
seems questionable whether effects of ImRs can be investigated in the other emotions given 
their low levels.  
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Effects on analogue symptoms 
Event-related stress symptoms (Hypothesis 1) 
Results of the 2 (t0 vs. t4) x 2 (ImRs vs. NIC) repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a 
significant main effect of Time for all three subscales of the IES-R, all Fs(1, 63) > 16.00, ps < 
.001, η²p > .21, but neither significant main effects of Condition nor significant interactions, 
all Fs(1, 63) < 1.96, ps > .166, η²p < .03. Contrary to the hypotheses, ImRs did not result in a 
stronger reduction of intrusions, avoidance, or hyperarousal assessed with the IES-R when 
compared to NIC (see Table 2.2). 
 
Intrusive memories (Hypothesis 2) 
The mean number of intrusive memories of the distressing life-event during the 1-week 
follow-up period was 2.45 (SD = 2.85; range 0-13). Participants in the ImRs group reported 
significantly fewer intrusions (M = 1.45, SD = 1.57; Mdn = 1.0) of the aversive memory 
targeted in this study than participants of the NIC group (M = 3.35, SD = 3.43; Mdn = 2.50), 
U = 359.0, p = .024, r = .28. On average, participants reported further 1.46 intrusions of other 
memories related to the life-event (SD = 2.44; range 0-11) with no differences between 
groups, U = 463.5, p = .359, r = .11. For frequencies of the different categories of intrusive 
memories per group see Table A.2 in the Supplementary Material. 
 
 
Effects on emotional response to memory reactivation 
Memory distress (Hypothesis 3) 
The 2 (t1 vs. t5) x 2 (ImRs vs. NIC) repeated measures ANOVA for memory distress 
revealed no significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 63) = 0.92, p = .342, η²p = .01, but a 
significant main effect of Time, F(1, 63) = 75.92, p < .001, η²p = .55, as well as a significant 
interaction, F(1, 63) = 4.81, p = .032, η²p = .07. As predicted, ImRs led to a greater reduction 
of distress in response to the memory reactivation task than NIC (see Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study I: ImRs of Aversive Autobiographical Memories 
 
37 
Memory-related negative emotions (Hypothesis 4) 
As sadness was found to be the only relevant memory-related negative emotion (see 
manipulation check), intervention effects on emotional responses to the memory were only 
tested using sadness as a dependent variable
3
. The 2 (t1 vs. t5) x 2 (ImRs vs. NIC) repeated 
measures ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of Condition, F(1, 63) = 0.37, p = .548, 
η²p = .01, but a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 63) = 16.89, p < .001, η²p = .21, as well as 
a significant interaction, F(1, 63) = 4.13, p = .046, η²p = .06. As expected, ImRs reduced 
sadness in response to the memory reactivation task significantly stronger than NIC (see 
Figure 2.2). 
 
Mastery (Hypothesis 5) 
The results of the 2 (t1 vs. t5) x 2 (ImRs vs. NIC) repeated measures ANOVA for 
mastery as dependent variable are illustrated in Figure 2.2. The significant main effects of 
Time, F(1, 63) = 24.98, p < .001 , η²p = .28, and Condition, F(1, 63) =  4.31, p = .042 , η²p = 
.06, were qualified by a significant interaction, F(1, 63) = 10.29, p = .002 , η²p = .14. As 
predicted, participants in the ImRs group reported significantly greater increases in mastery of 
the aversive situation in their memory. 
 
 
Exploratory analyses: Pre vs. post effects on affect and distress 
Results for positive affect revealed no significant main effect of Time (t2 vs. t3) or 
Condition (ImRs vs. NIC) nor a significant interaction, all Fs(1, 62) < 0.40, ps > .529 , η²p < 
.006. For negative affect, a significant main effect of Condition was found, F(1, 62) = 5.55, p 
= .022, η²p = .082, but neither a significant main effect of Time nor a significant interaction, 
all Fs(1, 62) < 2.08, ps > .154, η²p < .033. Mean scores per condition are shown in Table 2.2. 
Results for subjective distress revealed a significant main effect of Time, F(1, 62) = 18.85, p 
< .001 , η²p = .23, but no significant main effect of Condition nor a significant interaction, all 
Fs(1, 62) < 1.19, ps > .279, η²p < .02. There was an overall reduction in subjective distress 
from pre- to post-intervention, irrespective of experimental condition (see Table 2.2). 
 
 
____________________________________ 
3 
Results of exploratory analyses on the other five emotions revealed that ImRs was superior to NIC in 
decreasing anger and guilt. Both conditions equally reduced shame. No changes were observed for disgust and 
anxiety. Detailed results are provided in Figure A.2 and Table A.1 in the Supplementary Material 
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Discussion 
To address limitations of previous ImRs studies using the TFP (e.g., Dibbets & Arntz, 
2016; Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012), the present study investigated ImRs in the context of 
personally relevant autobiographical emotional memories, which can be considered a better 
analogue for memories targeted with ImRs in clinical practice. The aims of the present study 
were to evaluate the usefulness of the adapted analogue paradigm in ImRs research and to 
conduct a preliminary examination of possible mechanisms underlying ImRs. Specifically, we 
investigated (1) whether ImRs reduces event-related stress symptoms, (2) whether ImRs leads 
to a change in meaning of the memory thereby decreasing memory distress and memory-
related negative emotions, and (3) whether ImRs enhances feelings of mastery. 
 
 
Evaluation of the paradigm: Effects on analogue symptoms 
In order to evaluate the research paradigm, we tested whether the aversive 
autobiographical memories were associated with emotional distress and event-related stress 
symptoms, which could be modified through ImRs treatment. At the beginning of the study, 
participants still felt moderately distressed by the life-events and reported a mean number of 
six intrusive memories during the past week. Retrieving the memory of the distressing life-
event during the reactivation task led to significant increases in subjective distress, fear, and 
non-fear emotions. However, only levels of sadness were found to be high after memory 
reactivation. This might be explained by the types of life-events reported by participants in 
our study. It is also possible that our procedure used for memory reactivation was not 
successful in activating all memory-relevant emotions. In order to examine effects on 
different emotional states, the paradigm needs to be modified, e.g. by focusing on specific 
types of life-events (related to specific emotions) or by intensifying emotional activation, e.g. 
through using mental imagery for the memory reactivation task (see Holmes & Mathews, 
2010). 
Contrary to our first hypothesis, ImRs was not superior to NIC in reducing event-related 
stress symptoms (i.e., intrusions, avoidance, and hyperarousal). This is surprising given that 
ImRs has been shown to effectively reduce posttraumatic stress symptoms in clinical studies 
(Morina et al., 2017). One possible explanation for this discrepancy might be that our ImRs 
intervention was adapted for the purpose of the analogue study, thus deviating from clinical 
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studies regarding the intervention protocol (i.e., participants were not instructed to experience 
the scene from the adult’s and the child’s perspective as often done in clinical practice, see 
Arntz & Weertman, 1999) and regarding treatment intensity (i.e., we conducted only one 
ImRs session with a mean duration of 18 min). Moreover, our experimental procedure might 
have had nonspecific therapeutic effects (e.g., mere attention, talking about the life-event in 
an appreciative atmosphere), leading to reductions of stress symptoms independently of group 
allocation.  
In line with our second hypothesis, ImRs led to less intrusive memories of the 
distressing life-event than NIC during the week following the intervention. This finding 
extends results from recent laboratory studies on the preventive effects of ImRs on intrusion 
development (Dibbets & Arntz, 2016; Hagenaars & Arntz, 2012), by indicating that ImRs 
also has therapeutic effects on intrusion frequency of consolidated memories. Hence, we were 
able to successfully model treatment effects of ImRs on intrusive memories within the present 
paradigm. Interestingly, participants also reported some intrusions of memories that had not 
been explicitly targeted during study participation (i.e., during memory reactivation and 
ImRs), but were strongly related to their life-events. However, intrusion frequency of these 
memories did not differ between conditions. Due to floor effects, we might not have been able 
to detect potential treatment effects here. Surprisingly, although ImRs reduced intrusions of 
the memories targeted with the intervention (as measured via diaries), no treatment effects 
were evident on the Intrusion subscale of the IES-R. This discrepancy can most likely be 
explained by the different measurement approaches, as the retrospective assessment of 
intrusive memories with the IES-R can be expected to be more susceptible to memory biases 
than event-based immediate recording with diaries. It is also conceivable that participants 
rated the IES-R with respect to all event-related intrusive memories (including intrusions of 
memories that have not specifically been targeted within the study).  
In order to more reliably model treatment effects on symptomatic outcomes, 
modifications of the paradigm are needed. This will be crucial for a systematic test of 
mechanisms underlying ImRs, i.e. for an examination of the relationship between the 
hypothesized mechanisms (e.g., memory processes) and symptomatic change. For this 
purpose, it would be useful to enhance treatment intensity and to increase baseline symptom 
severity, e.g. through including memories related to more severe events, which can be 
expected to be associated with higher symptom levels. An assessment of additional types of 
symptoms (e.g., rumination, depressive symptoms) might be also important, given that 
Study I: ImRs of Aversive Autobiographical Memories 
 
42 
sadness was the most important emotion in our sample. Furthermore, future studies should 
integrate measures of imagery ability, given recent evidence that outcomes of imagery 
interventions might be influenced by the ability to vividly visualize (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, 
Saulsman, & Thibodeau, 2015). 
 
 
Examination of possible underlying mechanisms 
In line with our hypotheses on possible treatment mechanisms, ImRs led to significantly 
larger reductions of distress and negative emotionality (sadness) in response to memory 
retrieval after one week compared to NIC. These findings replicate results of two earlier 
studies (Çili et al., 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015) and provide further evidence that 
ImRs reduces negative emotional responses associated with aversive memories. However, as 
sadness was the predominant emotion in our sample, results cannot be generalized to 
memories associated with other emotions. From a theoretical perspective, the reduced 
emotional response to the memory indicates that ImRs might work through a change in 
meaning of the aversive memory representation (Arntz, 2012). Here, the combination of 
reactivating the aversive memory content and then introducing new and more positive 
information through ImRs appeared to be crucial, as reactivation in combination with 
distraction (reading magazines) as done in NIC was not as effective. However, it is important 
to note that although our experimental procedure was designed to initiate memory 
reconsolidation processes (see James et al., 2015) we could not explicitly test whether ImRs 
indeed interfered with the reconsolidation of the original memory. It is also possible that 
ImRs works through creating an alternative memory representation, which then competes 
with the original aversive memory (see e.g., retrieval competition account by Brewin, 2006). 
Future research should compare ImRs to other interventions that have been shown to 
successfully modulate aversive emotional memories, such as imaginal exposure treatment 
(e.g., Rothbaum & Schwartz, 2002) or eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing 
(EMDR; e.g., Lee & Cuijpers, 2013). Furthermore, it will be important to examine conditions 
under which ImRs most effectively changes aversive memories and the associated emotional 
responses (e.g., How and how long to reactivate? When to start the rescripting of the sequence 
of events?; see Dibbets & Arntz, 2016). In this regard, the introduced paradigm can be used to 
compare different variations of ImRs.  
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In line with our last hypothesis, ImRs participants reported greater increases in 
perceived mastery at 1-week follow-up than NIC participants. Our results imply that ImRs 
might have led to a revaluation of the memory content in terms of mastery. We specifically 
asked participants for an evaluation of controllability of the situation described during the 
memory reactivation task, i.e. for the original, not the rescripted sequence of events. 
Therefore, one might conclude that revaluation of the original situation has taken place in the 
ImRs group (see Arntz, 2012), potentially by enabling the individual to be in control of what 
is happening in their imagination, e.g., to defend one-self, to set boundaries, and to satisfy 
one’s needs. In the context of PTSD it has been also discussed whether ImRs works through 
enhancing the ability to control intrusive images (“imagery control”) (Long & Quevillon, 
2009). It is important to further investigate which elements of mastery can be changed 
through ImRs and whether the intervention might be beneficial to increase overall feelings of 
mastery, i.e. mastery of aversive events (as measured in our study), mastery of intrusive 
symptoms (e.g., Germain, 2004; Long & Quevillon, 2009), and mastery in difficult 
interpersonal situations. Finally, more research is needed to clarify whether enhanced mastery 
after ImRs is indeed associated with symptomatic change. Future studies are recommended to 
include more reliable measures of mastery. 
 
 
Exploratory analyses 
ImRs and NIC both reduced distress from pre- to post-intervention, but no changes in 
positive or negative affect emerged. Although ImRs entails intense confrontation with 
aversive memory contents, it seems to have equivalent short-term effects on distress and 
affect as mere distraction, pointing towards potential benefits of ImRs as a more tolerable 
treatment method compared to established exposure-based therapies (see also Siegesleitner, 
Strohm, Wittekind, Ehring, & Kunze, 2019a). To further investigate this assumption, future 
studies should include an additional exposure-based control condition. 
 
 
Limitations 
Results of the present study have to be interpreted in light of the following limitations: 
As our design did not include an active control condition, it currently remains unclear whether 
effects are specific to ImRs treatment or whether results could partially be explained by the 
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greater degree of exposure to memory content in the ImRs group. Future studies should 
compare ImRs to other interventions as well as to active experimental control conditions (e.g., 
to control for the duration of exposure to memory content, interaction with the experimenter, 
working memory load, or positive imagery).  
Our intervention protocol deviated from ImRs treatment as used in clinical practice 
regarding the additional memory reactivation task before the intervention starts (in patients 
the memory is emotionally activated only once in the first phase of the ImRs), thus limiting 
the generalizability of results to clinical settings. Moreover, we did not explicitly encourage 
participants to experience the memory from the younger vs. the older self’s perspective as 
typically done in clinical protocols (e.g. Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Wild & Clark, 2011). 
Until now, ImRs variations with and without such perspective taking have not been 
systematically compared regarding their therapeutic efficacy. Although findings from our 
study indicate that ImRs without perspective taking changes the meaning of autobiographical 
memories in healthy participants, it is possible that in patients with more severe or traumatic 
memories perspective taking is necessary for therapeutic success. Viewing earlier experiences 
from an adult’s perspective enables patients to self-distance and thus it might be particularly 
helpful to question maladaptive beliefs and to generate alternative meanings. In order to 
model processes underlying ImRs treatment as it is typically employed in patient samples, 
future analogue research is recommended to adopt clinical protocols (i.e. ImRs with 
perspective taking).   
With respect to findings from a lab study by Dibbets and Arntz (2016) showing that 
ImRs may be more effective when the participant’s individual hotspot of the memory is 
included, we initiated the rescripting of the memory immediately after the hotspot (preventing 
the hotspot during ImRs was therefore not possible). However, it remains an open question 
whether this procedure is also more effective in clinical settings. Alternatively, activated 
emotional arousal and the expectation of the upcoming trauma may suffice for initiating the 
rescripting in patient populations, allowing that parts of the traumatic events are 
prevented/undone (see e.g., Arntz, 2015; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Additional research is 
needed to clarify these issues. 
For practical reasons, we assessed baseline intrusion frequency retrospectively via 
questionnaires (overall estimate of numbers of intrusive memories), whereas intrusive 
memories during the week after the intervention were recorded day by day in an intrusion 
diary (allowing us to specifically analyze intrusions of the memory targeted in the study). 
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Given these different measurement approaches, a direct comparison between the numbers of 
intrusive memories at baseline and during the follow-up period was not possible and we were 
not able to control for baseline numbers of intrusive memories as measured with the diary. 
Consequently, group differences in intrusive memory frequency after the intervention can 
only carefully be interpreted as an effect of ImRs and future studies are recommended to 
include intrusion diaries in the week both before and after the interventions. Moreover, it is 
important to note that we did not only include image-based intrusive memories in the coding 
procedure, but also memories rated as “thoughts” by participants. This limits comparability of 
results to studies that restricted their analyses to intrusive images. Additionally, future studies 
should not only measure intrusive memories during the follow-up interval, but also intentional 
recollections of the targeted memories and/or the new images developed during the 
interventions, as this may influence the long-term outcome of the intervention. This appears 
especially informative as patients often receive homework assignments to intentionally think 
back to the reactivated memories to improve treatment effects. 
We only included life-events that had happened within the past 24 months, limiting 
generalizability of our results to older memories that have been argued to be less prone to 
change than more recent memories (Alberini, 2011). Although experimenters did not provide 
a rationale for ImRs and did not refer to ImRs as “intervention” or “treatment”, placebo 
effects of the imagery exercise cannot be completely ruled out. Finally, as we used a healthy 
and largely female student sample, results of the present study cannot be generalized to 
clinical populations or more heterogeneous samples (with respect to age, gender, and 
education). 
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present findings support the suitability of the adapted paradigm to 
systematically investigate the effects of ImRs in autobiographical emotional memories. The 
analogue procedure used in this study might be especially promising for research into 
memory processes involved in ImRs. In order to more reliably model treatment effects on 
analogue symptoms, it would be useful to increase baseline symptom severity and to enhance 
treatment intensity. Furthermore, it will be crucial to integrate active control conditions. The 
results of this study show that ImRs reduces intrusion frequency of aversive autobiographical 
memories, decreases memory-related emotional distress, and enhances feelings of mastery. In 
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sum, our findings underline the potential of ImRs as a transdiagnostic intervention in the 
treatment of psychopathology associated with aversive emotional memories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Study II: 
 
Imagery Rescripting of Aversive Autobiographical Memories: Psychological 
and Physiological Effects 
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Abstract 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is a promising intervention to reduce symptoms associated with 
aversive memories, but little is known about its working mechanisms. The present study 
investigates whether ImRs increases perceived mastery and attenuates emotional reactivity to 
memory retrieval on a subjective and physiological level. Seventy-nine individuals reporting 
memories of distressing real-life events were randomly allocated to ImRs, positive imagery 
(PI) or no-intervention control (NIC). The memory was reactivated before the intervention 
and at 1-week follow-up to assess subjective measures and physiological reactivity (heart rate 
[HR], skin conductance level [SCL], and facial electromyography activity [EMG]) during 
memory retrieval. ImRs was not superior to PI and NIC in increasing perceived mastery, but 
ImRs participants reported stronger reductions in subjective memory distress and negative 
emotionality (helplessness). Physiological reactivity (HR, EMG) was attenuated at follow-up 
with no differences between groups. Findings challenge the notion that changing perceived 
mastery is essential to reduce subjective emotional reactivity to aversive memories with 
ImRs. It needs to be tested, how findings from this laboratory study translate to ImRs for 
traumatic memories. 
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Introduction 
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is a promising imagery-based treatment strategy to target 
aversive memories in emotional disorders (Morina, Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). During ImRs, a 
memory is first emotionally activated using imagery. In a second step, patients are 
encouraged to change negative mental images of the distressing event into more positive 
outcomes according to their individual needs (Arntz, 2012; Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 
2007). Despite growing evidence for the efficacy of ImRs to reduce symptoms associated 
with aversive memories in different disorders (for a meta-analysis, see Morina et al., 2017), 
relatively little is known about the mechanisms underlying symptomatic change.  
A seminal theory on the nature of traumatic memories suggests that traumatic events are 
stored in associative memory networks in which information about the aversive stimulus 
situation is stored together with information about the meaning of the event, and about the 
verbal, behavioral, and physiological responses shown in response to the event (see Foa & 
Kozak, 1986; Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989; Lang, 1979). The model furthermore states 
that in order to foster emotional processing, which results in a reduction of memory-related 
emotional and physiological responding, the memory representation first needs to be 
activated; secondly, new information that is incompatible with the existing memory structure 
then needs to be incorporated (Foa & Kozak, 1986; Foa et al., 1989). Emotional processing 
theory in the context of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was originally developed by Foa 
and colleagues (1986; 1989) as a rationale for prolonged exposure treatment, whereby within-
session habituation to fear is regarded as an important component of corrective information 
that is integrated into the memory network. However, other interventions, such as ImRs, may 
be alternative means to first activate aversive memory structures and to then integrate 
corrective information (see e.g., Hackmann, 2011). Importantly, during ImRs corrective 
information is induced more explicitly, for example by generating mental images of the self 
as being competent and powerful or in control of what is happening. In this way, ImRs 
provides new meanings targeting dysfunctional beliefs typically experienced by patients with 
trauma-related disorders (e.g., of the self as being incompetent/helpless/incapable; see Foa & 
Rothbaum, 1998; Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In line with emotional processing theory, Arntz 
(2012) suggested that ImRs treatment works by activating aversive memories and then 
providing alternative meanings such that the memory representation of the aversive event is 
stored with a different and less negative meaning. This, in turn, should lead to reductions in 
memory-related negative emotional responses (Arntz, 2012).  
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There is preliminary evidence supporting the view that ImRs works by changing the 
meaning of memory representations. In laboratory-based analogue studies, ImRs has been 
shown to modify the negative valence of memories of aversive film/picture stimuli and to 
reduce associated negative emotional responding (Dibbets, Lemmens, & Voncken, 2018; 
Dibbets, Poort, & Arntz, 2012; Hagenaars & Arntz 2012). Moreover, there is evidence that 
ImRs might specifically work by fostering perceived mastery in the face of aversive 
experiences. Participants who had experienced distressing life-events appraised the originally 
distressing experience as being more controllable after ImRs indicating that the intervention 
had led to a revaluation of the aversive autobiographical memory contents (Strohm, 
Siegesleitner, Kunze, Ehring, & Wittekind, 2019). The beneficial effects of ImRs on 
perceived mastery may be due to the fact that during ImRs individuals are led to actively 
change the sequence of events according to their individual needs and to express action 
tendencies that had been inhibited in the original situation, such as defending oneself and 
disempowering the perpetrator (Arntz, 2012). In patients with nightmare disorder, perceived 
mastery (of the nightmare content) has been found to mediate the beneficial effects of ImRs; 
importantly, this mediation only emerged in the ImRs condition and was not observed in 
individuals receiving imaginal exposure treatment (Kunze, Lancee, Morina, Kindt, & Arntz, 
2019). This indicates that enhancing mastery might be a working mechanism that is rather 
specific for ImRs. 
In addition, there is evidence that ImRs attenuates negative emotional responding to 
autobiographical memories. Specifically, ImRs reduced negative emotions and distress 
triggered by memories of aversive life-events that were retrieved following the intervention 
(Cili, Pettit, & Stopa, 2016; Nilsson, Lundh, &Viborg, 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; 
Strohm et al., 2019). However, one limitation of the latter studies is that emotional responding 
to the memories was only assessed on a subjective level. If ImRs indeed modifies memory 
representations of distressing events such that the memory is stored with a less negative 
meaning, memory-related physiological responding should be reduced in addition to 
reductions of subjectively reported emotional responding to the memory (Arntz, 2012; see 
also the emphasis on physiological responding as an indicator of successful emotional 
processing in emotional processing theory: Foa et al., 1989). However, until now only few 
studies have included physiological outcome measures in the context of ImRs research.  
Findings from recent experimental studies using fear conditioning paradigms are 
inconclusive with respect to the effects of ImRs on physiological responding to conditioned 
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stimuli (Dibbets et al., 2018; Dibbets et al., 2012; Kunze, Arntz, & Kindt, 2019). In 
participants with increased health anxiety, ImRs (as well as imagery re-experiencing) yielded 
higher physiological activation (heart rate [HR]) during the intervention when compared to a 
positive imagery and a no intervention control condition (Tolgou et al., 2018). Moreover, 
there was a trend for ImRs yielding the greatest HR reductions during the intervention, 
possibly indicating successful emotional processing (Tolgou et al., 2018). In patients with 
social anxiety disorder (SAD), ImRs was found to selectively attenuate physiological 
reactivity (HR parameters) to a speech task when compared to verbal restructuring and a 
waitlist control condition, but the ImRs group was more reactive to the speech task after 
treatment indexed by skin conductance (Hyett et al., 2018). Taken together, there is 
preliminary evidence that ImRs leads to physiological activation during the intervention and 
reduces physiological responding to relevant stressors, but it has not been specifically 
examined whether ImRs attenuates the physiological reactivity to aversive autobiographical 
memories retrieved following treatment. 
The aim of the present study was twofold: First, it was aimed to replicate previous 
findings that ImRs leads to a revaluation of distressing memory contents regarding perceived 
mastery (Kunze et al., 2019; Strohm et al., 2019) and reduces self-reported negative 
emotional responses to memory retrieval (Cili et al., 2016; Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & 
Moscovitch, 2015; Strohm et al., 2019). Second, it was aimed to extend previous research by 
examining whether ImRs changes physiological responding to memories of aversive life-
events and whether increases in perceived mastery are associated with changes in emotional 
responding.  
The present study was based on an analogue paradigm used by Strohm et al. (2019). In 
this earlier study, the effects of ImRs versus a no intervention control group (NIC) were 
examined in healthy individuals reporting aversive memories of distressing real-life events. 
Subjective responses to memory retrieval were assessed before the intervention and at 1-week 
follow-up. In the current study, the design of this earlier study was extended by including (a) 
physiological measurements in addition to subjective reports and (b) a positive imagery 
condition (PI) as an additional active control condition. This second control condition was 
included to control for the effects of activating a memory representation in combination with 
inducing positive mental images, emotions, and meanings but without changing meaning-
relevant contents of the original aversive memory.  
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First, ImRs was expected to be superior to both control conditions in reducing 
subjective distress associated with the aversive life-event during the follow-up period and in 
reducing stress symptoms elicited by memory retrieval (re-experiencing, avoidance, 
dissociation). Second, in line with the proposed working mechanism and based on previous 
findings, ImRs was expected to be superior to PI and NIC in enhancing perceived mastery and 
in decreasing negative emotions, distress, and arousal in response to memory retrieval. 
Moreover, it was hypothesized that ImRs would yield stronger increases in self-reported 
positive emotions in response to memory retrieval. Third, ImRs was assumed to lead to 
stronger reductions in physiological arousal, indexed by HR and skin conductance level 
(SCL), as well as negative emotional valence, indexed by facial electromyography activity 
(EMG), in response to memory retrieval. Finally, the effects of ImRs, PI, and NIC on 
physiological recovery from retrieval of the aversive memory were explored.  
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Method 
Participants 
Individuals who had experienced a distressing life-event in the past 24 months (e.g., 
relationship break-up, job loss, bullying, interpersonal conflicts) were recruited via social 
media and on university campus. Participants had to meet the following inclusion criteria: (1) 
experience of a distressing but non-traumatic life-event (i.e., not meeting criterion A of DSM-
5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013) within the past 24 months, (2) subjective distress 
of at least 50 (on a 0-100 scale, ranging from not at all distressed to extremely distressed) at 
the time the event happened, (3) distress of at least 30 (on the same 0 – 100 scale) at the time 
of study participation, and (4) recurrent distressing memories of the life-event in the form of 
(a) intrusive thoughts or images, (b) nightmares or (c) emotional/physiological responding to 
reminders of the event. Individuals reporting a case of death as their life-event were excluded 
due to ethical concerns. Moreover, individuals who met the following criteria were excluded: 
(1) current diagnosis of a mental disorder (including acute suicidal tendencies), (2) lifetime 
diagnosis of PTSD/ psychotic disorder/ bipolar disorder, (3) psychological treatment at the 
time of study participation, (4) severe physical illness, (5) pregnancy, and (6) age below 18 or 
above 35 years. All inclusion and exclusion criteria were assessed in Session 1 using a short 
structured screening interview and the German version of the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview for DSM-5 (M.I.N.I. 7.0.2; Sheehan et al., 1998; Sheehan, 2016). 
Fifteen individuals had to be excluded from participation (n = 7 reported a life-event not 
meeting inclusion criteria; n = 7 met criteria for a current or lifetime diagnosis of the mental 
disorders specified above), leaving a total sample of 79 students included in this study (age: M 
= 24.20, SD = 3.84; 83.5% female). Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee 
at LMU Munich. Participants received either partial course credit or 22€. All participants 
gave written informed consent. 
 
 
Memory reactivation task 
In both sessions, a memory reactivation task was used to measure self-reported and 
physiological responses to memory retrieval. First, the most distressing “scene” of the life-
event was determined in order to get a specific memory for the memory reactivation task (and 
subsequently for ImRs). Additionally, participants were asked to indicate the most aversive 
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moment within this “scene” to specify the individual hotspot. The memory reactivation task 
comprised two phases: During Phase 1, participants were instructed to close their eyes and to 
vividly imagine the specified memory focusing on all sensory modalities and emotions. They 
were asked to describe the event as if it was happening right now in the first person 
perspective and in present tense. Phase 1 of memory reactivation ended with the participant 
imagining the individual hotspot (mean duration of Phase 1 was 3.96 min [SD = 1.64] in 
Session 1 and 3.13 min [SD = 0.71] in Session 2). Participants were then administered self-
report measures on responses to memory retrieval. For Phase 2 of memory reactivation, 
participants were instructed to close their eyes and to vividly imagine the hotspot of their 
memory for one minute (without talking) and to be aware of upcoming emotions. This phase 
was used for an additional recording of physiological responses to memory retrieval without 
talking, given that physiological reactions have been shown to be influenced by changes in 
respiration patterns during speech (see Beda, Jandre, Phillips, Giannella-Neto, & Simpson, 
2007; Quintana & Heathers, 2014).  
 
 
Experimental conditions 
Imagery rescripting  
In the ImRs condition, participants were first instructed to vividly imagine the aversive 
memory specified before and to describe it in detail from the first person perspective and in 
present tense, as if the event was happening at that moment. Participants were encouraged to 
focus on all sensory modalities, feelings, and body sensations. This first phase of the 
intervention aimed to reactivate memory-related emotions (duration: M = 3.41 min, SD = 
1.15) and it ended with the participant holding the image of the individual hotspot in mind. 
The rescripting of the memory (duration: M = 11.26 min, SD = 2.97) was then initiated and 
participants were asked to change the course of the event in any desired way to make it less 
distressing (changes could be realistic or unrealistic). They were encouraged to imagine the 
new script as vividly as possible and to describe it in detail. During the rescripting of the 
memory, the following questions were asked to support participants (see Arntz & Weertman, 
1999): What would you like to do/say? Ok, do it/say it! What do you feel? What do you think? 
Is there anything else you would like to change? Is there anything (else) you need?. When 
participants did not wish to include further changes but were satisfied with the new outcome, 
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they were asked to stay for a moment with the final positive image before concluding the 
imagery exercise. 
 
Positive imagery 
Participants were asked to vividly imagine a positive event of the past 24 months and to 
describe it to the experimenter in the first person perspective, present tense, focusing on body 
sensations and emotions (duration: M = 9.2 min, SD = 1.45). The positive event had to be 
unrelated to the distressing life-event. Participants rated the positive events as highly pleasant 
(time of the event: M = 93.64, SD = 8.44; time of study participation: M = 89.00, SD = 11.55; 
0-100 scale, ranging from not at all pleasant to extremely pleasant).  
 
No-intervention control condition 
Participants were provided neutral magazines and were asked to wait 20 minutes in the 
laboratory. 
 
 
Self-report measures  
Depressive symptoms 
The Patient Health Questionnaire-9 Item (PHQ-9; Krönke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001; 
German version: Löwe, Spitzer, Zipfel, & Herzog, 2002) was administered to test for baseline 
differences in depressive symptoms. The PHQ-9 is a reliable and valid measure of depression 
severity (Krönke et al., 2001; internal consistency in the present study: Cronbach’s α = .83).  
 
Event-related distress  
In order to assess intervention effects on distress related to the life-event, participants 
were asked how distressed they felt by the life-event during the past week on a 100-mm visual 
analogue scale (VAS) ranging from 0 (not at all distressed) to 100 (extremely distressed). 
 
Mastery  
After memory reactivation, perceived mastery was assessed by asking participants to 
verbally indicate how controllable they experienced the situation that they had just imagined, 
on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all controllable) to 100 (very controllable).   
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Emotions  
In order to assess memory-related emotional reactions 100-mm VAS for five negative 
(anxious, angry, sad, guilty, helpless) and three positive emotions (happy, satisfied, proud) 
were administered after memory reactivation (and at baseline). Participants were instructed to 
indicate how they felt at the moment on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (extremely). 
The distinct emotions were presented in the same order in both sessions (as listed above). 
 
Self-reported arousal  
Subjective physiological arousal was assessed after memory reactivation (and at 
baseline) using self-assessment manikins (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). On a scale ranging 
from 1 (very calm) to 9 (very aroused) participants were asked how aroused they felt at the 
moment.  
 
Memory distress  
Memory distress was assessed verbally after memory reactivation using Subjective 
Units of Distress (SUD). Participants were asked to indicate how distressed they felt at the 
moment on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all distressed) to 100 (extremely distressed).  
 
Stress symptoms 
The Response to Script Driven Imagery Scale (RSDI; Hopper, Frewen, Sack, Lanius & 
van der Kolk, 2007) was used to measure stress symptoms evoked by mental imagery of the 
aversive memories on three subscales: re-experiencing (4 items), avoidance (3 items), and 
dissociation (3 items), with a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 (a great deal). In the 
present study instructions of the RSDI were adapted to measure responses to the memory 
reactivation task, which was not script-driven. Mean subscale scores were computed to 
facilitate comparison between scales (see Hopper et al., 2007). The RSDI has demonstrated 
good psychometric properties (Hopper et al., 2007; internal consistencies in the present study: 
Cronbach’s α’s = .59 - .83).  
 
 
Physiological measurement 
Physiological activity was recorded using a stationary system for psychophysiological 
measurements (Refa; Twente Medical Systems International [TMSi], EJ Oldenzaal, The 
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Netherlands) and the recording software package Polybench 1.30 (TMSi). The sampling rate 
was 1024 Hz. A wet band on the left wrist served as grounding for all channels. Recorded 
data were further processed using the software Autonomic Nervous System Laboratory 
(ANSLAB) version 2.6 (Blechert, Peyk, Liedlgruber, & Wilhelm, 2015). Physiological 
activity before the memory reactivation task (1 min resting baseline), during memory 
reactivation (Phase 1: imagination with verbal narrative of the life-event; Phase 2: 
imagination of the hotspot without talking), and after memory reactivation (2 min. recovery 
phase) was included for analyses; for each of these experimental periods, mean scores of HR, 
SCL, and EMG were computed.  
 
Heart rate (HR) 
Electrocardiography (ECG) was used to measure cardiovascular activity (HR in beats 
per minute [bpm]) as an index for physiological arousal (Mauss & Robinson, 2009). ECG 
electrodes were applied on the upper sternum and lowest rib on the left side. A 0.05 Hz 
highpass filter was applied during ECG measurement. Raw data were bandpass filtered 
between 0.5 and 40 Hz (Wilhelm, Grossman, & Roth, 1999). For further processing, the 
software ANSLAB 2.6 (Blechert et al., 2015) was used to automatically determine R-spikes, 
which were subsequently manually checked.  
 
Skin conductance level (SCL) 
SCL was also assessed as an index for physiological arousal (Mauss & Robinson, 
2009). Electrodermal activity was obtained by applying a constant voltage (0.5V) between the 
index and middle finger of the non-dominant hand, using an isolated electrodermal amplifier 
module supplied by Becker Meditec (Karlsruhe, Germany) and Ag/AgCl electrodes with 5-
mm inner-diameter, filled with isotonic paste (TD-246, MedCat, Germany). Mean SCL in μS 
was computed and fluctuations with an increase larger than 0.02 μS were considered a 
response. 
 
Electromyography (EMG) 
In order to measure the valence of participants’ emotional states during memory 
reactivation, facial muscle activity of the m. corrugator supercilii was assessed (see Mauss & 
Robinson, 2009) by one pair of 2-mm inner-diameter Ag/AgCl electrodes, that were placed 
with centers approximately 1 cm apart above the participant’s right eye-brow (Fridlund & 
Cacioppo, 1986). EMG preprocessing using ANSLAB 2.6 comprised a 28 Hz high-pass filter, 
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50 Hz notch filter, rectification, low pass filtering (15.92 Hz) and 50 ms moving average 
filter.  
 
 
Procedure 
The study consisted of two sessions with seven days in between the sessions. Both 
sessions took place at the same time of the day. Questionnaires were administered digitally 
(unless otherwise specified in 2.4) using the online platform Unipark
®
 and Eprime. For an 
overview of the study procedure see Figure 3.1.  
 
Session 1 
First, screening interviews were administered to assess inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
After study inclusion, electrodes for physiological measurements were attached and 
participants then filled out baseline questionnaires (t0: sociodemographic data, PHQ, event-
related distress, emotions, self-reported arousal) and were provided a demonstration of an 
imagery exercise by the experimenter (imagination of today’s breakfast). This was followed 
by a 1-min baseline assessment of HR, SCL, and EMG. Next, the memory reactivation task 
was administered that included self-report measures referring to memory reactivation Phase 1 
(t1: mastery, emotions, self-reported arousal, memory distress) and the two phases of 
physiological measurement described above. After memory reactivation, participants were 
instructed to relax for two minutes (recovery phase), followed by the RSDI (t2). After a 10-
min break, participants were randomly allocated to ImRs (n = 27), PI (n = 25) or NIC (n = 27) 
using a computer-generated allocation sequence. Groups were stratified by gender. The 
experimenter was blind to condition until the beginning of the interventions.  
 
Session 2 
Participants first filled out baseline questionnaires (t3: event-related distress, emotions, 
self-reported arousal), followed by a 1-min baseline assessment of HR, SCL and EMG. Next, 
the memory reactivation task was administered using the same memory and the same 
procedure as in Session 1 (including t4: mastery, emotions, self-reported arousal, memory 
distress, and physiological measurement Phases 1 and 2). After a 2-min recovery phase, 
participants filled out RSDI (t5). Finally, participants were fully debriefed. 
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Statistical analyses 
A manipulation check was carried out to test effects of the memory reactivation task on 
subjective and physiological responses during Session 1 using 2(Time) x 3(Condition) 
repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVAs) for self-reported arousal, HR, SCL, EMG 
and two repeated measures multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) for negative and 
positive emotions as dependent variables.  
Main analyses for event-related distress, memory distress, mastery, and RSDI, 
comprised a series of 2(Time) x 3(Condition) repeated measures ANOVAs. For emotions and 
self-reported arousal, reactivity scores (Session 1: t1 – t0; Session 2: t4 – t3) were computed 
and hypotheses were tested using 2(Time) x 3(Condition) repeated measures ANOVAs on 
reactivity scores. For physiological measures, reactivity and recovery indices were computed 
for both sessions (see Hyett et al., 2018). Reactivity was defined as the difference between 
baseline physiological activity and activity during the first minute of memory reactivation 
Phase 1 (imagination with verbal narrative of the life-event; reactivity = mean memory 
reactivation Phase 1 - mean baseline) or Phase 2 (imagination of the hotspot without talking; 
reactivity = mean memory reactivation Phase 2 - mean baseline), respectively. Recovery was 
defined as the difference between baseline physiological activity and activity during the last 
minute of recovery (i.e., mean recovery - mean baseline). A series of 2(Time) x 3(Condition) 
repeated measures ANOVAs was conducted for reactivity and recovery scores of HR, SCL, 
and EMG. For self-report and physiological measures, significant interaction effects were 
followed up using planned contrasts on change scores (Session 2 – Session 1) to test for 
differences between ImRs and the control conditions (ImRs vs. PI+NIC) as well as between 
ImRs and PI. Partial eta squared (η²p) or Cohen’s d were used as effect sizes and criterion of 
significance was set at α = .05 (two-sided) for all analyses.  
Due to technical problems, physiological data of three participants were not recorded (n 
= 1 ImRs; n = 2 NIC) and data for single measurement phases were missing in four 
participants in Session 1 and one participant in Session 2. Self-report measures were 
erroneously not administered in some participants (n = 1 for RSDI, emotions, arousal; n = 2 
for event-related distress). These participants were excluded from the respective analyses.   
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Results 
Sample characteristics and baseline comparisons 
There were no significant differences between conditions on sociodemographic and 
baseline measures (see Table 3.1).  
 
 
Manipulation check  
For self-reported arousal, there was an overall increase from pre- to post-memory 
reactivation (t0 vs. t1) during Session 1, F(1, 75) = 183.35, p < .001, η²p = .71, with no 
differences between conditions, all Fs(2, 75) < 0.60, ps > .552 , η²ps < .02. Levels of negative 
emotions increased from pre- to post-memory reactivation (t0 vs. t1), whereas levels of 
positive emotions decreased, all Fs(5, 71 / 3, 73) > 33.39, ps < .001 , η²ps > .70, with no 
differences between conditions,  all Fs(10, 144 / 6, 148) < 1.03, ps > .419 , η²ps < .07 (see 
Table 3.2).  
The manipulation check for physiological measures revealed an increase in HR from baseline 
to both phases of memory reactivation, all Fs(1, 71 /1, 72) > 13.48, ps < .001 , η²ps > .16. 
Additionally, groups differed significantly in their overall HR levels, all Fs(2, 71 /2, 72) > 
6.48, ps < .003 , η²ps > .15, with ImRs participants showing the highest mean HR across time 
points. However, there were no significant Time x Condition interaction effects, all Fs(2, 71/ 
2, 72) < 2.48, ps > .091, η²ps < .06. While SCL increased from baseline to memory 
reactivation Phase 1 (imagination with verbal narrative), reductions in SCL emerged from 
baseline to memory reactivation Phase 2 (imagination of hotspot), all Fs(1, 71 /1, 72) > 4.43, 
ps < .039 , η²ps > .06, with no differences between groups, all Fs(2, 72/ 2, 71) < 1.35, ps > 
.267; η²ps < .04. EMG activity only increased in response to memory reactivation Phase 2, 
F(1, 71) = 23.12, p < .001, η²p = .25, but not in response to memory reactivation Phase 1, F(1, 
71) = 0.27, p = .605, η²p < .01, with no differences between groups, all Fs(2, 71) < 0.89, ps > 
.416; η²ps < .02. Therefore, only the EMG reactivity score for Phase 2 (imagination of the 
hotspot) was included in the main analyses.  
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Subjective outcomes 
Event-related distress  
Conditions differed in baseline to follow-up changes of distress related to the life-event 
as indicated by a significant Time x Condition interaction, F(2, 74) = 4.26, p = .018, η²p = .10. 
Planned contrasts revealed stronger reductions in distress from Session 1 to Session 2 in ImRs 
compared to the control conditions (PI+NIC), t(74) = -2.80, p = .007, d = 0.68, with ImRs 
yielding stronger decreases than PI,  t(74) = 2.84, p = .006, d = 0.80 (see Figure 3.2). 
 
Mastery 
Increases in perceived mastery from Session 1 to Session 2 were evident, F(1, 76) = 
14.62, p < .001, η²p = .16, with no differences between conditions, all Fs(2, 74/ 2, 76) < 0.85, 
p > .432, η²ps < .02 (see Figure 3.2).  
 
Emotions 
Pre- and posttreatment reactivity scores per condition are provided in Table 3.2. For 
helplessness, changes in reactivity differed significantly between groups as indicated by a 
significant Time x Condition interaction, F(2, 75) = 5.14, p = .008, η²p = .12. Planned 
contrasts showed that ImRs reduced emotional reactivity (helpless) to the memory more 
strongly from Session 1 to Session 2 than the control conditions, t(75) = -3.05, p = .003, d = 
0.73, and ImRs led to stronger decreases in helplessness than PI, t(75) = -2.12, p = .037, d = 
0.59. For anxiety, sadness, anger, and guilt, reductions of emotions to the memory could be 
observed from Session 1 to Session 2, all Fs(1, 75) > 4.49, ps < .037 , η²ps > .06, with no 
differences between conditions, all Fs(2, 75) < 2.29, ps > .109, η²ps < .06. However, there was 
a (non-significant) descriptive trend indicating that ImRs reduced sadness (medium-sized 
interaction effect: F(2, 75) = 2.03, p = .138, η²p = .05) and anger (small- to medium-sized 
interaction effect: F(2, 75) = 1.11, p = .336, η²p = .03) more strongly than NIC and PI. 
Reactivity of positive emotions (happy, satisfied, proud) was reduced from Session 1 to 
Session 2, all Fs(1, 75) > 6.52, ps < .013 , η²ps > .08, with no differences between conditions, 
all Fs(2, 75) < 1.39, ps > .256, η²ps < .04. 
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Table 3.2. Means and standard deviations of emotional reactivity to the memory 
before (Session 1; t1-t0) and after the interventions (Session 2; t4-t3)  
    Group  Session 1    Session 2  
        M (SD)   M (SD)  
Negative emotions 
    
 
   Anxious 
 
ImRs 
 
22.69 (25.36) 
 
9.23 (16.59)  
  
PI 
 
20.24 (18.40) 
 
 9.97 (23.89)  
  
NIC 
 
11.32 (20.53) 
 
10.46 (22.34)  
  Angry 
 
ImRs 
 
32.89 (32.95) 
 
18.25 (22.54)  
  
PI 
 
26.86 (25.20) 
 
19.98 (20.62)  
  
NIC 
 
31.74 (40.16) 
 
28.73 (31.95)  
  Sad 
 
ImRs 
 
41.27 (31.02)  23.80 (23.86)  
  
PI 
 
32.69 (23.11)  26.84 (20.57)  
  
NIC 
 
30.38 (23.12)  27.73 (24.45)  
 Guilty 
 
ImRs 
 
19.74 (29.49) 
 
14.54 (19.57)  
  
PI 
 
22.74 (31.99) 
 
12.45 (23.87)  
  NIC  19.85 (23.97)   14.81 (20.22)  
   Helpless  ImRs  42.11 (32.66)  21.52 (25.79)  
  PI  33.55 (27.28)  30.44 (24.30)  
  NIC  25.55 (29.00)  30.51 (29.74)  
Positive emotions        
   Happy  ImRs  -32.43 (18.24)  -18.74 (15.24)  
  PI  -30.87 (14.86)  -20.46 (14.00)  
  NIC  -27.68 (17.51)  -22.54 (13.37)  
   Satisfied  ImRs  -32.41 (18.77)  -20.97 (15.97)  
  PI  -31.22 (21.28)  -22.10 (18.44)  
  NIC  -28.57 (20.64)  -22.78 (15.63)  
   Proud  ImRs  -18.59 (24.16)   -9.03 (19.20)  
  PI  -14.08 (27.12)  -12.31 (20.48)  
  NIC  -23.10 (22.66)  -11.20 (16.05)  
Arousal         
   SAM  ImRs  2.81 (1.47)  1.69 (1.16)  
  PI  2.84 (2.12)  2.20 (1.76)  
  NIC  2.37 (1.60)  2.11 (1.40)  
Note: ImRs = Imagery rescripting; PI = Positive imagery;  
NIC = No-intervention control condition; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin. 
 
 
 
Self-reported arousal 
 For self-reported arousal (see Table 3.2), reductions in reactivity scores were observed 
from Session 1 to Session 2, F(1, 75) = 11.19, p = .001, η²p = .13, with no differences between 
conditions, all Fs(2, 75) < 1.55, ps > .219, η²ps < .04. Descriptively, there was a trend for 
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ImRs to yield stronger reductions of arousal compared to PI and NIC (medium-sized 
interaction effect: F(2, 75) = 1.55, p = .219, η²p = .04). 
 
Memory distress 
 Changes in memory distress differed between groups as indicated by a significant 
Time x Condition interaction effect, F(2, 74) = 3.36, p = .040, η²p = .08. Planned contrasts 
showed that ImRs reduced memory distress more strongly from Session 1 to Session 2 
compared to the control conditions (PI+NIC), t(76) = -2.09, p = .040, d = 0.50, and ImRs was 
superior to PI alone, t(76) = 2.58, p = .012, d = 0.72 (see Figure 3.2). 
 
Stress symptoms 
Results for the re-experiencing subscale of the RSDI (see Table 3.3) revealed that 
symptoms were reduced from Session 1 to Session 2, F(1, 75) = 32.81, p < .001, η²p = .30, 
with no differences between groups, all Fs(2, 75) < 0.71, ps > .496 , η²ps < .02. Avoidance 
symptoms increased over time, F(1, 75) = 3.98, p = .050 , η²p = .05, with no differences 
between conditions, Fs(2, 75) < 0.35, ps > .703 , η²ps < .01. For the dissociation subscale no 
significant main or interaction effects were observed, all Fs(1, 75 / 2, 75) < 2.35, ps > .129 , 
η²ps < .03. 
 
 
 
Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations of stress symptoms during memory 
reactivation before (Session 1) and after the interventions (Session 2)  
    Group  Session 1    Session 2  
        M (SD)   M (SD)  
RSDI  
    
 
   Re-experiencing 
 
ImRs 
 
4.29 (3.44) 3.44 (1.26)  
  
PI 
 
4.34 (3.81)  3.81 (1.01)  
  
NIC 
 
4.57 (3.69)  3.69 (1.24)  
   Avoidance 
 
ImRs 
 
1.72 (1.37)  2.13 (1.42)  
  
PI 
 
2.12 (1.34)  2.24 (1.41)  
  
NIC 
 
1.79 (1.41)  2.12 (1.49)  
   Dissociation 
 
ImRs 
 
1.89 (1.18)  2.21 (1.42)  
  
PI 
 
1.96 (1.05)  2.13 (1.16)  
  
NIC 
 
1.71 (1.24)  1.80 (1.48)  
Note: RSDI = Response to Script Driven Imagery Scale; ImRs = Imagery rescripting;  
PI = Positive imagery; NIC = No-intervention control condition. 
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Physiological outcomes  
Heart rate 
Reactivity of HR (Phase 1 and 2) in response to memory retrieval decreased from 
Session 1 to Session 2, all Fs(1, 72/ 1, 70) > 9.13, p < .003, η²ps > .11, with no differences 
between groups, all Fs(2, 72/ 2, 70) < 2.60, p > .081, η²ps < .07. For HR recovery, no 
significant main effects or interaction effects emerged, all Fs(1, 72/ 2,72) < 1.50, p > .225, 
η²ps  < .04. Descriptive data are provided in Table 3.4. 
 
Skin conductance level 
For SCL, reactivity (Phase 1 and 2) increased from Session 1 to Session 2, all Fs(1, 72/ 
1, 70) > 24.09, p < .001, η²ps > .26, but no differences between groups were evident, all Fs(2, 
72/ 2, 70) < 1.51, p > .227, η²ps < .04 (see Table 3.4). SCL recovery scores decreased over 
time, F(1, 72) = 31.89, p < .001, η²p = .31, with no differences between groups, all Fs(2, 72) < 
1.18, p > .312, η²ps < .03.  
 
Electromyography 
EMG reactivity to memory reactivation (Phase 2) decreased from Session 1 to Session 
2, F(1, 71) = 9.51, p = .003, η²p = .12, but no significant differences between conditions 
emerged, all Fs(2, 71) < 0.97, ps > .386, η²ps < .03. Results for EMG recovery revealed a 
significant Time x Condition interaction effect, F(1, 71/ 2, 71) = 4.20, p = .019, η²p  = .11. 
Planned contrasts showed that ImRs did not significantly differ from the control conditions 
(PI+NIC), t(69.99) = -0.65, p = .517, d = 0.15, but there was a trend indicating that ImRs 
yielded stronger recovery in Session 2 compared to PI, t(35.59) = 2.01, p = .0.52, d = 0.56. 
Descriptive data are displayed in Table 3.4. 
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Table 3.4. Means and standard deviations of physiological reactivity and 
recovery scores before (Session 1) and after the interventions (Session 2)  
    Group  Session 1    Session 2  
        M (SD)   M (SD)  
Reactivity (with talking) 
    
 
   HR 
 
ImRs 
 
13.60 (8.54)  8.02 (6.49)  
  
PI 
 
16.06 (12.29)  11.24 (7.82)  
  
NIC 
 
15.64 (8.79)  11.51 (8.04)  
   SCL 
 
ImRs 
 
0.18 (0.38)  0.86 (0.85)  
  
PI 
 
0.24 (0.64)  0.75 (0.95)  
  
NIC 
 
0.13 (1.04)  0.78 (0.90)  
   EMG 
 
ImRs 
 
0.14 (3.23)  -1.25 (2.34)  
  
PI 
 
-0.36 (2.34)  -1.46 (2.80)  
  
NIC 
 
0.68 (2.74)  -1.27 (3.12)  
Reactivity (without 
talking)    
 
 
  
   HR 
 
ImRs 
 
0.38 (5.41)  -0.47 (4.11)  
  
PI 
 
3.37 (5.37)  1.17 (4.32)  
    NIC   3.64 (6.60)  1.28 (4.17)  
   SCL  ImRs  -.33 (0.59)  0.67 (0.88)  
  PI  -.23 (0.69)  0.43 (0.81)  
  NIC  -.60 (1.07)  0.66 (1.44)  
   EMG  ImRs  1.63 (2.20)  0.20 (3.04)  
  PI  1.29 (3.34)  0.87 (3.60)  
  NIC  2.31 (3.62)  0.73 (5.07)  
Recovery         
   HR  ImRs  0.07 (3.48)  0.41 (3.67)  
  PI  2.07 (3.14)  0.51 (3.78)  
  NIC  1.88 (3.54)  0.79 (4.87)  
   SCL  ImRs  -0.45 (0.60)  0.47 (0.78)  
  PI  -0.40 (0.77)  0.17 (0.93)  
  NIC  -0.70 (1.15)  0.47 (1.47)  
   EMG  ImRs  0.28 (2.14)  -1.02 (1.58)  
  PI  0.03 (1.63)  -0.16 (1.57)  
  NIC  0.54 (1.89)  -1.32 (1.87)  
Note: ImRs = Imagery rescripting; PI = Positive imagery; NIC = No-intervention control  
condition; HR = Heartrate in bpm; SCL = skin conductance level in µS; EMG =  
Electromyography in µV. Reactivity = memory reactivation - baseline; Recovery =  
recovery phase – baseline. 
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Discussion 
The present study examined whether ImRs leads to a revaluation of memory contents of 
distressing real-life events regarding perceived mastery and reduces subjective emotional and 
physiological responding to the distressing memories when compared to a positive imagery 
condition (PI) and no intervention (NIC). Thus, this study aimed to test a mechanism 
potentially underlying ImRs: Specifically, a change in the meaning of the memory, which is 
suggested to then lead to an attenuation of emotional and physiological responding when the 
memory is retrieved after treatment (see Arntz, 2012; Foa et al., 1989).  
 
 
Effects on stress symptoms 
In line with the hypothesis and in accordance with results from clinical studies (Morina 
et al., 2017), ImRs participants reported to experience the strongest reductions of event-
related distress during the 1-week follow-up period. However, this treatment effect was not 
evident for stress symptoms evoked by the memory reactivation task (i.e., re-experiencing, 
avoidance, dissociation) as measured with the RSDI. For avoidance and dissociation 
symptoms floor effects were observed (baseline levels for avoidance: M = 1.87, SD = 1.37; 
dissociation: M = 1.85, SD = 1.15; scale ranging from 0 [not at all] to 6 [a great deal]) that 
probably impeded the detection of possible intervention effects in the current non-clinical 
sample. Re-experiencing symptoms were reported to be more pronounced (M = 4.40, SD = 
0.92), but it appears that one brief ImRs session was not enough to yield treatment effects 
over and above habituation effects. Alternatively, it is possible that involuntary re-
experiencing could not be assessed in a reliable way during the memory reactivation task, 
possibly due to the fact that participants were instructed to actively generate vivid mental 
images of the hotspot and to stay with these images. Re-experiencing symptoms might be 
more reliably measured using script-driven memory reactivation tasks (see Lang, Levin, 
Miller, & Kozak, 1983).    
 
 
Changing the meaning of the memory: Effects on perceived mastery  
Unexpectedly, the beneficial effects of ImRs treatment on perceived mastery could not 
be replicated (Kunze et al., 2019; Strohm et al., 2019). ImRs was not superior to the control 
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conditions and the intervention yielded lower increases in perceived mastery (d = 0.47) when 
compared to our earlier study (Strohm et al., 2019: d = 1.17).  One possible explanation for 
the inconsistent findings might be that in the current study mastery was assessed immediately 
after participants had reached the hotspot. This means that memory contents were (explicitly) 
reactivated that had not been addressed during ImRs as the rescripting of the memory was 
initiated at the point in the sequence of events that followed the hotspot (see Dibbets & Arntz, 
2016). In our earlier study, participants were asked for mastery ratings after they had 
completed their description of the entire (original) sequence of events. This may indicate that 
new meanings regarding mastery might be better accessible after treatment when the 
rescripted parts of the memory are reactivated (see Strohm et al., 2019). Memory contents that 
have not been changed through the intervention, however, might still be associated with the 
original negative meanings. This is of interest with respect to two differential memory 
processes that have been discussed to underlie the change in meaning through ImRs. While 
the results challenge the notion that ImRs directly changes the original memory representation 
of the aversive stimulus, for example via reconsolidation processes (see e.g., Arntz, 2012), 
they may be more in line with the idea that ImRs builds a new and more positive memory 
representation, which then competes with the original one for retrieval depending on 
respective retrieval cues (e.g., Brewin, 2006).   
Moreover, it is conceivable that the adapted ImRs protocol as used in the present (and 
our earlier study) has to be optimized in order to yield stable effects on perceived mastery 
across studies. Looking at the experimental and clinical research literature, different variants 
of ImRs protocols have been used and it still remains an open question how ImRs is optimally 
delivered to successfully change memory-related meanings. Comparing “active” versus 
“passive” ImRs interventions, perceived mastery has been shown to be equally enhanced 
when individuals are encouraged to imagine themselves to intervene (i.e., “active”) versus 
when they were asked to imagine helpers to change the situation (i.e., “passive”; 
Siegesleitner, Strohm, Wittekind, Ehring, & Kunze, 2019b). However, it is less clear how 
actively therapists should be involved during ImRs. In the current study, rescripting of the 
memory was performed by participants themselves with the experimenters only asking 
supportive questions but not making suggestions for possible changes to the image. This 
procedure might be problematic for individuals feeling too powerless to intervene in the 
image or struggling to generate alternative and more adaptive meanings that can be 
incorporated during ImRs. For these individuals clinical protocols (e.g. Arntz & Weertman, 
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1999) recommend therapists to take a more directive role by providing alternative meanings 
or introducing changes to the image themselves during ImRs. Furthermore, clinical protocols 
typically instruct patients to first enter the situation as their adult self and to then switch to the 
younger self’s perspective (see Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Wild & Clark, 2011). This change 
of perspective was not explicitly included in the present ImRs protocol, but might have been 
helpful to increase perceived mastery, as it enables individuals to self-distance of what is 
happening in the image thereby making adaptive meanings probably more accessible. Another 
way to support patients to change dysfunctional meanings might be a cognitive preparation 
phase (as typically done with SAD patients; see Wild & Clark, 2011), in which participants 
are first encouraged to explicitly challenge memory-related dysfunctional beliefs and to 
generate more adaptive meanings (e.g., the self as being a valuable 
person/competent/strong/powerful) that are then incorporated into the memory using ImRs in 
a second step.  
 
 
Subjective emotional responses to memory retrieval 
Findings of the manipulation check showed that the memory reactivation task was 
successful in activating aversive memories. All distinct negative emotional states assessed 
(anxious, angry, sad, guilty, helpless) reached medium to high levels after memory 
reactivation (see Table B.1 in the Supplementary Material). As hypothesized and in line with 
findings from previous studies (Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; Strohm et 
al., 2019), ImRs led to greater decreases in memory distress than the control conditions. 
Moreover, ImRs participants reported the strongest reductions of helplessness. For anxiety, 
sadness, anger, guilt and self-reported arousal no significant group differences emerged, but 
for sadness, anger and arousal there was a descriptive trend toward ImRs yielding stronger 
decreases than PI and NIC (small- to medium-sized interaction effects). Participants of all 
groups reported lower reactivity of positive emotions at follow-up. 
Taken together, these findings partially support the notion that ImRs attenuates 
subjectively experienced emotional responding to aversive autobiographical memories. For 
feelings of helplessness, introducing meaning-relevant changes to the memory with ImRs 
(e.g., mental images of the self being in control/ being able to handle the aversive situation/ 
being a strong person) was more beneficial than generating unrelated positive images and 
meanings as done in PI (e.g., mental images of holidays, personal achievements). As ImRs 
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was not superior to the control conditions in enhancing perceived mastery (see previous 
section), the present findings challenge the notion that reductions in emotional responding 
through ImRs are specifically produced by changing negative meanings about mastery. In 
fact, ImRs may have modified different types of meanings. For example, although the 
situation itself may still be appraised as uncontrollable (i.e., appraisal of the situation stays 
unchanged), the self may nevertheless be perceived as being more competent to deal with the 
situation (i.e., appraisals about the self has changed), thus feeling less helpless. Alternatively, 
emotional changes through ImRs may precede cognitive changes. In other words, it is 
possible that reductions in negative emotions are not produced by reappraisal of memory-
related meanings; in fact corrective emotional experiences during ImRs might lead to changes 
of negative meanings (see e.g., Lane, Ryan, Nadel, & Greenberg, 2015). As dysfunctional 
beliefs associated with traumatic memories exhibit large variability (e.g., depending on the 
nature of the life-event), future studies should integrate more comprehensive and/or more 
individualized measures of memory-related meanings about the self, others and the world (see 
e.g., Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011). 
Finally, it is important to note that the results on subjective responses to the memory 
were inconsistent across emotional states. Specifically, ImRs was not superior to control 
conditions in reducing anxiety and guilt (for sadness and anger, ImRs was superior only on a 
descriptive level). Looking at the life-events reported in the present sample, it is plausible that 
anxiety was not the principal memory-related emotion (see Table B.1 in the Supplementary 
Material), which may explain the lack of treatment effects on anxiety. Preliminary evidence 
suggests that ImRs is more effective in addressing non-fear emotions (e.g., guilt) when 
compared to imaginal exposure (Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & 
Christianson, 2007). However, more systematic research is needed to address the question 
how ImRs compares to other interventions, such as imaginal exposure treatment (e.g., 
Rothbaum & Schwartz, 2002) or eye movement desensitisation and reprocessing (EMDR; 
e.g., Lee & Cuijpers, 2013), in reducing distinct memory-related emotional states. 
 
 
Physiological responses to memory retrieval 
The manipulation check revealed that physiological measures differed in their reactivity 
to the memory reactivation phases. While HR was reactive to both phases, EMG activity 
increased only in response to the imagination of the hotspot without talking (Phase 2) and 
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SCL only in response to the imagination with verbal narrative (Phase 1; see Figures B.1-3 in 
the Supplementary Material).  
Contrary to the hypothesis, SCL reactivity increased over time with no differences 
between groups. This finding can most likely be explained by the fact that baseline SCL 
scores for Session 1 were found to be unexpectedly high (and significantly higher when 
compared to Session 2) resulting in only small SCL increases when confronted with the 
memory reactivation task Phase 1 and even SCL reductions when confronted with Phase 2 
(see Figure B.2 in the Supplementary Material) before treatment. It is probable that within the 
current study design, too little time was allowed for SCL to reach resting baseline levels 
during Session 1 (see Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2007). Furthermore, SCL might also have 
been increased due to anticipatory arousal to the expected experimental tasks. Consequently, 
findings for SCL are difficult to interpret with respect to the study hypotheses. 
For physiological arousal (indexed by HR) and negative emotional valence (indexed by 
EMG corrugator activity) reductions in response to memory reactivation from Session 1 to 
Session 2 emerged in all groups, indicating that in the present study ImRs had no beneficial 
effects on physiological reactivity over and above habituation effects through exposure to the 
memory contents (during the memory reactivation task that was the same in all conditions). 
From a theoretical perspective, the observed reductions of physiological reactivity may 
indicate that emotional processing has taken place across groups (see Foa et al., 1989). This is 
surprising given that exposure to memory contents was very short in the control conditions (4-
6 min). Moreover, ImRs participants, but not NIC and PI participants, were supported to 
actively integrate corrective information (meanings) into the memory, but this appeared to 
have no additional effect on physiological responding. However, it is important to note that 
non-traumatic aversive memories were examined in healthy individuals and physiological 
reactivity can be expected to be lower in the present sample when compared to patient 
populations with traumatic memories (e.g., PTSD, SAD). Therefore, replications in clinical 
samples are clearly needed to answer the question whether ImRs reduces physiological 
responding to aversive memories and how the intervention compares to exposure treatments 
in addressing physiological hyper-reactivity.  
Interestingly, the present results revealed a trend indicating that ImRs yielded stronger 
physiological recovery as measured with EMG when compared to PI. As emotional 
dysregulation in PTSD has not only be linked to enhanced physiological reactivity, but also to 
a failure to physiologically recover after exposure to trauma-related stimuli (e.g., Norte et al., 
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2012), future research should test the effects of ImRs on physiological recovery in clinical 
samples. 
 
 
Limitations 
The results of the current study have to be interpreted in light of the following 
limitations: First, as ImRs was not compared to other therapeutic interventions (e.g., 
prolonged exposure or cognitive restructuring) it remains unclear whether the reported 
intervention effects are specific for ImRs treatment. It is also possible that the observed 
effects can (partially) be explained by the greater extent of exposure to the memory in the 
ImRs condition. In order to draw conclusions about differential effects and working 
mechanisms (e.g., which intervention is most effective in addressing different negative 
meanings, subjective emotional responding or physiological reactivity?), future studies should 
integrate experimental conditions controlling for the extent of exposure to the memory and/or 
active treatment conditions. Second, in the present sample, it was not possible to test 
associations between hypothesized mechanisms (e.g., changes in emotional responding to the 
memory) and symptomatic change, for example via mediational analyses (Kazdin, 2007). 
Thus, only preliminary interpretations about mechanisms underlying ImRs treatment can be 
drawn. Moreover, perceived mastery, memory distress and emotional states were assessed 
each by only one item thereby limiting the reliability of results. As an analogue sample with 
individuals reporting non-traumatic life-events was used, findings cannot be generalized to 
patient populations with traumatic memories. Moreover, memories of recent life-events 
(within the past 24 months) were included. In clinical practice, however, ImRs is often 
employed for childhood memories, which might be less prone to change (Alberini, 2011) and 
which can be expected to be linked to more persistent dysfunctional beliefs about the self, 
others and the world (e.g., Young, Klosko, Weishaar, 2003). In the present study an additional 
phase of memory reactivation without talking was used in order to be able to interpret altered 
physiological responding as resulting from psychological processes and not as a function of 
changes in respiratory patterns produced during speech. However, the present procedure has 
the disadvantage of not measuring the initial physiological response to memory reactivation 
(i.e., Phase 1 in the present procedure) without participants talking out loud. Future studies 
should use script-driven imagery tasks, which allow a highly standardized presentation of the 
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aversive memory contents with physiological measurements not being contaminated by 
speech behavior. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Findings of the present study show that ImRs reduces subjectively experienced distress 
and feelings of helplessness associated with aversive autobiographical memories. The 
beneficial effects of ImRs on perceived mastery were not replicated in the present study 
indicating that the observed change in memory-related emotional responding were not 
produced by changes in beliefs about perceived mastery. The effects of one brief ImRs 
session on physiological reactivity did not exceed habituation effects through mere exposure 
to memory contents. To further examine mechanisms underlying ImRs, additional research in 
clinical populations is needed to clarify how the present findings translate to clinically 
relevant traumatic memories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Study III: 
 
Imagery Rescripting versus Cognitive Restructuring for Social Anxiety: 
Treatment Effects and Working Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Study III: ImRs vs. CR for Social Anxiety 
 
78 
Abstract 
Negative mental images in social anxiety are often linked to memories of distressing social 
experiences. Imagery rescripting (ImRs) has been found to be a promising intervention to 
target aversive memories, but mechanisms underlying ImRs are largely unknown. The present 
study aimed to replicate findings on the effects of ImRs compared to cognitive restructuring 
(CR) for social anxiety and to extend previous research by examining working mechanisms. 
Highly socially anxious individuals (N=77) were randomly allocated to ImRs, CR, or no 
intervention (NIC). A speech task was performed at baseline and at 1-week follow-up. Only 
CR led to substantial reductions in social anxiety symptoms at follow-up. Decreases in 
negative appraisals and emotional distress in response to the speech task did not differ 
between conditions. Regarding variables indicative of working mechanisms, ImRs led to 
stronger increases in positive emotions than CR and NIC. Both active treatments yielded 
immediate reductions in emotionally anchored idiosyncratic self-beliefs, but CR was superior 
to ImRs at follow-up. The present study supports the benefits of CR for social anxiety. 
Findings indicate that ImRs needs to be optimized when delivered as a brief stand-alone 
intervention in a subclinical analogue sample. The interpretation of results on potential 
working mechanisms is limited as ImRs was not effective in reducing social anxiety 
symptoms. Future directions for research into working mechanisms of ImRs are discussed.  
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Introduction 
Negative mental imagery in social anxiety  
Cognitive models of social anxiety disorder (SAD) suggest that negative mental images 
of the self are a key maintaining factor of the disorder (Clark & Wells, 1995; Hofmann, 2007; 
Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Image content is often linked to former aversive social 
experiences (e.g., being bullied, being publicly criticized; Hackmann, Clark, & McManus, 
2000). It is suggested that in socially anxious individuals memories of these experiences are 
stored in the form of negative self-images, which are reactivated later in anxiety-provoking 
situations (Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004).  
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is considered to be the treatment of choice for SAD 
(Mayo-Wilson et al., 2014) and typically includes cognitive and behavioral techniques 
(Hofmann & Smits, 2008). Although CBT programs for SAD have been found to be 
efficacious, a substantial proportion of patients do not achieve clinically significant 
improvements by the end of treatment (Hofmann & Smits, 2008; Mayo-Wilson et al., 2014; 
Rodebaugh, Holaway, & Heimberg, 2004). Given the role of socially traumatic memories in 
SAD, it has been suggested that specifically targeting these aversive memories might be 
promising (Norton & Abbott, 2017; Wild & Clark, 2011).  
 
 
Imagery rescripting as a treatment approach for social anxiety  
Imagery rescripting (ImRs) is an imagery-based intervention for aversive memories that 
has increasingly been incorporated in CBT programs for SAD (e.g., Wild & Clark, 2011; 
McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014). During ImRs, patients are instructed to visualize an aversive 
memory and to change it in imagination according to their emotional needs (Arntz, 2012; 
Holmes, Arntz, & Smucker, 2007). Thus, ImRs aims to update the idiosyncratic meaning of 
the memories thereby reducing associated negative (self-)images, beliefs, and emotions 
(Arntz, 2012; Morina, Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). There is promising evidence that ImRs may 
be an efficacious treatment strategy for different disorders including SAD (for a meta-
analysis, see Morina et al., 2017). Several studies have found that one session of ImRs 
significantly improved social anxiety symptoms (Lee & Kwon, 2013; Wild, Hackmann, & 
Clark, 2007; Wild, Hackmann, & Clark, 2008), also when delivered as a stand-alone 
intervention, i.e., without prior cognitive restructuring (CR; Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 2012; 
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Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). Norton and Abbott (2016) specifically 
compared the effects of one session of ImRs versus CR. Results showed that both 
interventions equally reduced social anxiety symptoms and yielded reductions in anticipatory 
appraisal and distress with respect to an impromptu speech. However, CR was superior to 
ImRs in reducing maladaptive self-beliefs while only ImRs led to decreases in negative self-
imagery indicating that the interventions may differ regarding their working mechanisms 
(Norton & Abbott, 2016).  
 
 
Mechanisms underlying imagery rescripting 
Research into mechanisms underlying ImRs is only in its beginnings, but in order to 
optimize the intervention, a better understanding of how ImRs works is crucial. It has been 
proposed that ImRs might work by changing the idiosyncratic meaning of aversive 
experiences (Arntz, 2012) and, more specifically, by leading to emotionally anchored 
reappraisal of core beliefs (Norton & Abbott, 2016; Nilsson et al., 2012; Wild et al., 2008). 
During ImRs, positive meanings are offered in the form of images. Based on evidence that 
mental imagery elicits stronger emotions than verbal thinking (Holmes & Mathews, 2010), it 
is conceivable that generating alternative meanings during ImRs is associated with stronger 
emotional activation than questioning maladaptive beliefs verbally (Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 
2009). Consequently, it has been argued that alternative meanings offered in the form of 
images might be more emotionally anchored, more believable, and more likely to lead to 
changes in behavior than meanings that are exclusively generated as verbal representations 
(Holmes & Mathews, 2010). This assumption is in line with the idea that one can distinguish 
between different levels of meaning representations (see e.g., Barnard & Teasdale, 1991; but 
also Power & Dalgleish, 1999). According to the Model of Interacting Cognitive Subsystems 
(ICS; Barnard & Teasdale, 1991), intellectual beliefs (propositional level) can be 
distinguished from emotional beliefs (implicational level). Intellectual beliefs are described as 
knowing something “with the head”, whereas emotional beliefs correspond to an intuitive and 
implicit sense of knowing “with the heart” or “having a gut feeling” (Barnard & Teasdale, 
1991). Cognitive treatment strategies can be expected to change beliefs primarily on a 
propositional level. ImRs, however, as an experientially oriented treatment technique invokes 
different sensory modalities thereby addressing the implicational meaning level, which is 
suggested to be necessary to then change emotional beliefs (see Arntz, 2012; Wild et al., 
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2008). Although emotionally anchored reappraisal (i.e., changing emotional beliefs) has 
often been discussed as a mechanism underlying ImRs (Norton & Abbott, 2016; Nilsson et 
al., 2012; Wild et al., 2008), empirical evidence is largely missing. Preliminary evidence 
stems from a study investigating the effects of ImRs on emotional versus intellectual beliefs 
in a sample of patients with Bulimia Nervosa (Cooper, Todd, & Turner, 2007). ImRs was 
found to be more effective than a control intervention in reducing emotional self-beliefs in 
this study. However, it needs to be tested whether these results generalize to socially anxious 
individuals. To conclude, it remains an open question whether ImRs elicits stronger emotions 
thereby being more effective than verbal interventions in changing emotional beliefs in social 
anxiety.  
 
 
What works for whom? 
 In order to optimize psychological interventions, it is not only important to understand 
working mechanisms, but also to identify factors that can be used to tailor treatment to 
patients’ characteristics (Norcross & Wampold, 2011), such as habitual use of certain 
modalities or strategies. First evidence suggests that habitual use of imagery is not associated 
with symptom changes in imagery-enhanced CBT for SAD (McEvoy, Erceg-Hurn, Saulsman, 
& Thibodeau, 2015), but this has not specifically been tested for stand-alone ImRs. The 
effects of CR, on the other hand, may be influenced by the individual’s habitual use of 
cognitive reappraisal. It has been found that cognitive reappraisal increases during CBT for 
SAD (Goldin et al., 2012), but it is less clear whether individuals with higher use of 
reappraisal before treatment benefit more from CR. 
  
 
 The present study 
The present study aimed to 1) investigate the effects of ImRs and CR as stand-alone 
interventions for social anxiety, 2) extend previous research by exploring mechanisms 
underlying ImRs, and 3) examine factors that might be used to select treatment strategies for 
the individual patient. Laboratory-based analogue studies in healthy or subclinical samples 
have been suggested to be a valuable means to investigate models of psychopathological 
processes and treatment mechanisms under highly controlled and standardized conditions (for 
reviews‚ see Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; Van den Hout, Engelhard, & 
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McNally, 2017). The present study was based on the procedure of an earlier clinical study by 
Norton and Abbott (2016), but a sample of individuals with subclinical levels of social 
anxiety symptoms was used. Highly socially anxious individuals were randomly allocated to 
either one session of ImRs, one session of CR, or to a no-intervention control condition 
(NIC). Outcomes were assessed at baseline and at 1-week follow-up. A speech task was 
included to examine intervention effects on responses to a social stressor.  
In line with previous findings, ImRs and CR were expected to yield greater decreases in 
social anxiety symptoms than NIC. It was hypothesized that ImRs and CR would reduce 
negative appraisals and emotional responses (i.e., subjective physiological arousal and 
distress) to the speech task when compared to NIC. Regarding the proposed mechanisms, 
ImRs was assumed to lead to stronger emotional activation than CR. While ImRs and CR 
were expected to be equally effective in decreasing strength of intellectual self-beliefs, it was 
hypothesized that ImRs would yield stronger reductions in strength of emotional self-beliefs. 
Additionally, the relationship between the hypothesized mechanisms and symptomatic change 
were explored. Finally, it was examined whether habitual use of imagery and cognitive 
reappraisal would influence outcomes of ImRs and CR. 
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Method 
Participants  
Highly socially anxious individuals were recruited via advertisements on university 
campus and social media. To partake in the study, participants had to score ≥30 (clinical cut-
off) on the German version of the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; German version: 
Stangier, Heidenreich, Berardi, Golbs, & Hoyer, 1999) in an online screening.  
During the first session, eligible participants were administered the Mini International 
Neuropsychiatric Interview for DSM-IV (M.I.N.I. 5.0.0; Sheehan et al., 1998; German 
version: Ackenheil, Stotz-Ingenlath, Dietz-Bauer, & Vossen, 1999) to screen for exclusion 
criteria: 1) current diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, 2) current and/or lifetime 
diagnosis of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder/ Psychotic Disorder/ Bipolar Disorder, 3) 
Substance Dependence during the past 12 months, 4) acute suicidal tendencies. Further 
exclusion criteria were: 5) age <18 or >35 years, 6) current psychological treatment, 7) 
pregnancy, 8) severe physical illness. Additionally, participants had to meet the following 
inclusion criteria (assessed with the Imagery Interview): 1) negative mental self-image(s) in 
feared social situations, 2) aversive social experience related to the image, and 3) maladaptive 
self-belief.  
A total of 96 participants attended Session 1, 16 of which had to be excluded after 
baseline interviews (n=10 current/lifetime diagnosis of mental disorders specified above; n=4 
no negative mental self-image; n=2 no maladaptive self-belief). Three participants did not 
attend the follow-up session, leaving a final sample of 77 highly socially anxious participants 
(80.52% female; age: M = 22.46, SD = 3.88). All participants gave written informed consent 
and were reimbursed by receiving partial course credit or 20€. The study was approved by the 
local Research Ethics Committee at LMU Munich. 
 
 
Clinical interviews  
The M.I.N.I. (Sheehan et al., 1998; German version: Ackenheil et al., 1999) was 
administered to assess current diagnoses according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000). 
Additionally, the SAD module of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I 
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(SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1997; German version: Wittchen, Zaudig, & 
Fydrich, 1997) was administered. 
 
 
Imagery interview  
The Imagery Interview was based on the Waterloo Images and Memories Interview 
(WIMI; Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovitch, 2011) and on the interview 
used by Norton and Abbott (2016). The semi-structured interview assessed negative self-
imagery, aversive memories, and maladaptive self-beliefs. First, participants were provided a 
definition of mental imagery. Second, participants were asked to define their most anxiety-
provoking social situation and to image themselves being in such a situation (with eyes 
closed). They were instructed to become aware of whether there was a mental image that 
tends to come to their mind in this kind of situation and to describe the mental image in detail. 
Third, participants were asked when they first felt the way they did in the image and to 
imagine the respective event describing the situation in the first person, present tense. This 
was used to determine whether there was an early aversive memory related to the mental 
image and gather information on this memory. Finally, participants opened their eyes. In 
order to specify the idiosyncratic self-belief derived from the negative mental image and the 
aversive memory, they were then asked: “What do the image and the memory tell about you 
as a person?”. Participants were instructed to summarize the meaning of the image in form of 
a short statement. 
 
 
Speech task 
In order to measure reactions to a social stressor, participants were asked to give a 3min 
video-recorded impromptu speech (see Norton & Abbott, 2016) on a given political topic in 
both sessions (the order of the two topics was counterbalanced). Participants were informed 
beforehand that the speech would be evaluated later by independent raters and they were 
given 30sec to prepare the speech. 
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Symptom measures  
Social interaction anxiety   
The 20-item SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998; German version: Stangier et al., 1999) was 
used to assess social interaction anxiety during the past seven days on a scale ranging from 0 
(not at all) to 4 (extremely). The SIAS has been shown to be a specific and sensitive screening 
instrument for SAD and has demonstrated good psychometric properties (Mattick & Clarke, 
1998; Stangier et al., 1999; internal consistencies in the present study: Cronbach’s α’s=.88-
.91).  
 
Fear of negative evaluation   
The 12-item Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale-Revised (BFNE-R; Carleton, 
McCreary, Norton, & Asmundson, 2006; German version: Reichenberger et al., 2016) was 
administered to measure fear of negative evaluation by others on a scale ranging from 1 (not 
at all characteristic of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic of me). The German version of the 
BFNE-R has demonstrated good psychometric properties (Reichenberger et al., 2016; internal 
consistency in the present study: Cronbach’s α’s=.93-.94). 
 
Depressive symptoms 
In order to test for baseline group differences in depressive symptoms, the Patient 
Health Questionnaire-9 Item (PHQ-9; Krönke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001; German version: 
Löwe, Spitzer, Zipfel, & Herzog, 2002) was administered. The PHQ-9 is a reliable and valid 
measure of depression severity (Krönke et al., 2001) 
 
 
Speech task measures  
Public speaking anxiety 
In order to verify the relevance of the speech task as a stressor participants were asked 
to indicate how anxious they had felt when giving a speech/presentation during the last week 
(or how much they imagined they would have felt if no situation had occurred), on a scale 
from 0 (not at all anxious) to 3 (extremely anxious).  
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Appraisals of negative evaluation of the speech 
The Probability and Consequences Questionnaire (PCQ; Rapee & Abbott, 2007) asks 
participants to rate their appraisal of the likelihood (7 items) and cost (7 items) of negative 
evaluation of their speech on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all likely/bad) to 4 (extremely 
likely/bad). In the current study, subscales showed good internal consistencies (probability-
subscale: Cronbach’s α’s=.79-.83; cost-subscale: Cronbach’s α’s=.87-.88). 
 
Distress  
Subjectively experienced levels of distress were assessed using Subjective Units of 
Distress (SUD), ranging from 0 (not at all distressed) to 100 (extremely distressed).  
 
Arousal  
Self-assessment manikins (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994) were used to assess self-
reported physiological arousal on a scale ranging from 1 (very calm) to 9 (very aroused).  
 
 
Measures of mechanisms 
Emotional activation 
The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule -Extended (PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 
1994; German version: Grühn, Kotter-Grühn, & Röcke, 2010) was administered to assess 
changes in positive and negative emotions. In this study the general dimensions “positive 
affect” (PA) and “negative affect” (NA) were included as well as the subscales “fear”, 
“hostility”, “guilt”, “sadness”, “joviality”, “self-assurance”, and “attentiveness”. Scales range 
from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). Internal consistencies were good in the 
current study (PA: Cronbach’s α’s=.82-.89; NA: Cronbach’s α’s=.80-.85). 
 
Strength of intellectual and emotional beliefs 
The idiosyncratic maladaptive self-belief was identified during the Imagery Interview. 
The self-belief was read out to participants, and they were asked to rate the strength of this 
belief in two ways (see Cooper et al., 2007). For the intellectual belief, participants were 
asked to indicate how much they would rationally agree to their belief on a scale ranging from 
0 (I do not agree at all) to 100 (I completely agree). For the emotional belief, participants 
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were asked how much they felt the belief was true, regardless of what they were thinking 
rationally on a scale ranging from 0 (feels not true at all) to 100 (feels completely true).  
 
 
Habitual use of mental imagery and cognitive reappraisal 
The Spontaneous Use of Imagery Scale (SUIS; Kosslyn, Chabris, Shephard & 
Thompson, 1998; German version: Görgen, Hiller, & Witthöft, 2016) was administered to 
assess inter-individual differences in everyday use of mental images. Scales range from 1 
(never appropriate) to 5 (completely appropriate). The German version has demonstrated 
good reliability (Cronbach’s α=.85; Görgen et al., 2016; present study: Cronbach’s α=.81). 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003; German version: 
Abler & Kessler, 2009) measures the frequency of habitual use of cognitive reappraisal with 
six items that are rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The German version has demonstrated good reliability (Abler & Kessler, 2009; present study: 
Cronbach’s α=.78).  
 
 
Interventions 
Imagery rescripting  
The ImRs procedure was based on protocols by Arntz and Weertman (1999) and Wild 
and Clark (2011). Participants were first given a short rationale. Stage 1 of the intervention 
started with participants closing their eyes and vividly imagining the aversive memory 
(identified in the Imagery Interview) from the perspective of their younger-self. Participants 
were instructed to describe the situation in the first person, present tense, and to include all 
sensory modalities. This first stage aimed to reactivate emotions related to the memory. Stage 
2 of ImRs was initiated by instructing participants to imagine the scene from the perspective 
of their current adult-self who is witnessing the events as a bystander. Participants were asked 
to describe what they see is happening to their younger-self and were then encouraged to 
intervene in any way they wished. When the adult-self felt fully satisfied, Stage 3 was 
initiated by asking participants to relive the memory again from the perspective of their 
younger-self, experiencing the interventions of their adult-self (as induced during Stage 2). 
Additionally, the younger-self was encouraged to express further unmet needs (e.g., 
emotional support, compassion, distraction). When the needs of the younger-self were 
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satisfied and participants did not wish to apply further changes, the ImRs procedure was 
concluded by asking participants to dwell on the final positive image (see Nilsson et al., 2012; 
Norton & Abbott, 2016). Note that the ImRs procedure was not preceded by cognitive 
restructuring, nor did the instructions explicitly refer to the idiosyncratic self-belief. The mean 
duration of ImRs was 22.35min (SD = 6.20).  
 
Cognitive restructuring  
The cognitive restructuring procedure was based on the protocol by Wild and Clark 
(2011). After participants had been provided a rationale, they were asked to outline evidence 
for their idiosyncratic negative self-belief. Participants were then encouraged to challenge the 
self-belief by collecting evidence against it. To support this process participants were asked to 
consider alternative explanations for their experiences (including the early aversive memory), 
to think of experiences contradicting the maladaptive belief, and to evaluate the aversive 
memory from an adult perspective. All evidence for and against the negative self-belief was 
written down on a worksheet. Finally, participants were instructed to rephrase the original 
maladaptive belief into a more helpful statement. The mean duration of CR was 23.74min (SD 
= 4.40). 
 
No-intervention control condition  
Participants in the no-intervention control group were provided neutral magazines and 
were instructed to wait for 30min in the laboratory. They were asked not to use personal 
belongings. 
 
 
Procedure   
The study comprised two sessions, which were one week apart. Two experimenters 
carried out different parts of the procedure so that the speech task and intervention were not 
administered by the same experimenter. For a detailed overview, see Figure 4.1. 
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Statistical analyses 
A series of 2(Time) x 3(Condition) repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out for 
social anxiety symptoms (t0; t3), for speech task measures (pre-speech1; pre-speech2), and 
for positive and negative emotions (t1; t2). To follow up significant interaction effects, 
planned contrasts on change scores were conducted (ImRs+CR vs. NIC; ImRs vs. CR). 
Effects on intellectual and emotional self-beliefs were tested with 3(Time) x 3(Condition) 
repeated measures ANOVAs. Significant interaction effects were followed up using planned 
contrasts (ImRs+CR vs. NIC; ImRs vs. CR). For ImRs participants, Pearson correlations were 
computed between mechanisms and symptomatic change, and between habitual use of mental 
imagery and symptomatic change. For CR, correlations were computed between habitual use 
of cognitive reappraisal and symptomatic change. A significance level of α=.05 (two-tailed) 
was used for all analyses. Partial eta squared (η²p) or Cohen’s d were used as effect sizes. 
 
 
Power analysis 
Results of a sample-size calculation (two-tailed, α = .05, power = .80, run with 
G*Power 3.1) with medium to large effect sizes (d = .70; see Morina, 2017) showed that a 
sample size of 76 was required to detect significant differences between active treatments and 
NIC. 
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Results 
Participant characteristics and baseline comparisons  
There were no significant baseline differences between conditions in any of the 
variables (see Table 4.1). Mean age at the time of the aversive event was 12.86 years (SD = 
4.55; range 3-27), with significant differences between groups
4
 (ImRs: M = 13.88, SD = 4.90; 
CR: M = 13.76, SD = 4.60; NIC: M = 10.88, SD = 3.55), F(2,74) = 3.78, p = .027.  
 
 
Social anxiety symptoms 
Social interaction anxiety  
For SIAS scores (see Table 4.2), there was no main effect of Condition, F(2, 74) = 1.97, 
p = .147, η²p = .05, but a significant effect of Time, F(1, 74) = 17.94, p < .001, η²p = .20, and a 
significant interaction effect, F(2, 74) = 3.22, p = .046, η²p = .08. Planned contrasts revealed 
that there was no difference between active treatment groups compared to NIC in reducing 
social interaction anxiety, t(74) = 1.05, p = .298, d = 0.26. However, CR led to stronger 
decreases than ImRs, t(74) = 2.29, p = .025, d = 0.64. Descriptively, substantial reductions in 
SIAS scores were only evident in CR (Mdiff  = 6.22, SD = 7.87), but not in ImRs (Mdiff  = 1.76, 
SD = 6.46) or in NIC (Mdiff  = 2.20, SD = 6.59), see Figure 4.2. 
 
Fear of negative evaluation  
Results for BFNE-R (see Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics) revealed a significant main 
effect of Time, F(1, 74) = 5.70, p = .020, η²p = .07, but neither a significant effect of 
Condition, F(2, 74) = 1.09, p = .342, η²p = .03, nor a significant interaction effect, F(2, 74) = 
2.90, p = .061, η²p = .07. Descriptively, there was a trend indicating that CR (Mdiff  = 3.61, SD 
= 4.22) led to stronger reductions in fear of negative evaluation than both ImRs (Mdiff  = 0.76, 
SD = 7.03) and NIC (Mdiff  = 0.16, SD = 5.10), see Figure 4.2. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
4 
It was tested whether age of the aversive memory (i.e. time that had passed since the event) had an influence on 
main symptomatic outcomes. However, results remained unchanged when including age of the memory as a 
covariate. Note that age of the aversive memory was not significantly different in the two active treatment 
conditions (ImRs and CR). 
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Figure 4.2. Effects of imagery rescripting (ImRs) vs. cognitive restructuring (CR) vs. no-
intervention control condition (NIC) on (a) social interaction anxiety (SIAS), and (b) fear of 
negative evaluation (BFNE-R). Error bars represent SEM. 
 
a 
b 
Study III: ImRs vs. CR for Social Anxiety 
 
94 
Table 4.2. Means and standard deviations for symptom measures and mechanism 
variables before the interventions (t0/t1), after the interventions (t2) and at follow-up (t3) 
    Group  t0 / t1   t2  t3  
        M (SD)   M (SD)  M (SD)  
SIAS 
    
   
  
ImRs 
 
40.84 (13.21) 
 
  39.08 (13.84)  
  
CR 
 
37.93 (12.06) 
 
  31.70 (12.91)  
  
NIC 
 
42.28 (12.49) 
 
  40.08 (12.45)  
BFNE-R 
 
 
 
    
  
ImRs 
 
40.20 (11.00) 
 
  39.44 (11.03)  
  
CR 
 
39.44 (10.36) 
 
  35.84 (10.98)  
  
NIC 
 
41.88 (10.07) 
 
  41.72 (9.72)  
PANAS PA 
  
 
 
    
  
ImRs 
 
23.12 (5.20)  30.48 (8.21)    
  
CR 
 
22.89 (6.79)  26.41 (7.12)    
  
NIC 
 
22.92 (6.13)  23.44 (6.89)    
PANAS NA 
  
 
 
    
  
ImRs 
 
19.04 (6.77) 
 
13.92 (3.64)    
  
CR 
 
18.19 (6.29) 
 
14.41 (5.37)    
    NIC   18.60 (5.58)   13.48 (3.12)    
Intellectual belief          
  ImRs  51.60 (27.53)  39.40 (26.91)  48.80 (26.55)  
  CR  64.74 (29.83)  40.37 (25.79)  42.52 (29.49)  
  NIC  57.8 (33.32)  55.48 (32.32)  57.24 (29.63)  
Emotional belief          
   ImRs  90.40 (10.88)  62.52 (19.71)  73.80 (18.10)  
  CR  84.07 (16.82)  56.11 (29.00)  52.78 (27.92)  
  NIC  83.08 (20.92)  81.36 (21.90)  79.60 (20.74)  
Note: ImRs = Imagery rescripting; CR = Cognitive restructuring; NIC = No-intervention 
control condition; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; BFNE-R = Brief Fear of Negative 
Evaluation Scale-Revised; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; PA = positive 
affect; NA = negative affect.   
  
 
 
 
 
Speech task measures
5
 
Appraisals of negative evaluation of the speech  
For both subscales of the PCQ, there were significant main effects of Time, all Fs(1, 74) 
> 9.74, ps < .003, η²ps > .12, but no significant interaction effects, all Fs(2, 71) < 2.28, ps > 
.110, η²ps <.06.  
 
____________________________________ 
5 
In some participants, speech-related questionnaires were erroneously not administered (PCQ: n = 3; SUD: n = 
4; SAM: n = 2) and these participants were excluded from the respective analyses. 
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The main effect of Condition was significant for probability, F(2, 71) = 3.13, p = .050, η²p = 
.08, but not for cost of negative evaluation, F(2, 71) = 1.13, p = .330, η²p = .03. ImRs and CR 
did not yield significantly greater reductions in appraisals of negative evaluation compared to 
NIC (see Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3. Means and standard deviations for speech task measures before (speech 1) and after 
(speech 2) intervention 
    Group   Speech 1   Speech 2  
        M (SD)   M (SD)  
Negative Evaluation: Probability
a
 
    
 
  
ImRs 
 
15.46 (4.25) 
 
14.79 (4.66)  
  
CR 
 
13.04 (5.62) 
 
10.27 (5.45)  
  
NIC 
 
14.25 (5.93) 
 
13.33 (5.93)  
Negative Evaluation: Cost
a
 
 
   
 
  
ImRs 
 
13.50 (5.87) 
 
12.25 (6.10)  
  
CR 
 
12.46 (6.71) 
 
9.27 (4.64)  
  
NIC 
 
13.79 (5.98) 
 
12.29 (6.52)  
Distress (SUD)
b
 
  
   
 
  
ImRs 
 
66.50 (29.77) 57.42 (27.33)  
  
CR 
 
75.12 (22.01) 55.35 (28.42)  
  
NIC 
 
72.17 (23.10) 65.65 (24.33)  
Arousal (SAM)
c
 
  
    
  
ImRs 
 
6.67 (1.61) 
 
5.79 (1.35) 
 
  
CR 
 
6.62 (1.50) 
 
5.65 (1.67) 
 
   NIC   6.28 (1.67)   6.00 (1.61)   
Note: ImRs = Imagery rescripting; CR = Cognitive restructuring; NIC = No-intervention control 
condition; SUD = Subjective Units of Distress; SAM = Self-Assessment Manikins. 
  
a
n = 74; 
b
n = 73; 
c
n = 75. 
 
 
Distress  
For SUD, a significant effect of Time was found, F(1, 70) = 17.41, p < .001, η²p = .20, 
but neither a significant main effect of Condition nor a significant interaction effect could be 
observed, Fs(2, 70) < 2.12, ps > .128, η²ps < .06. Reductions in distress in response to the 
speech did not differ between conditions (see Table 4.3). 
 
Arousal  
Results for SAM revealed a significant effect of Time, F(1, 72) = 11.35, p = .001, η²p = 
.14, but neither a significant effect of Condition nor a significant interaction effect emerged, 
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F(2, 72) = 1.05, p = .354, η²p = .03. ImRs and CR were not more effective than NIC in 
reducing arousal in response to the speech (see Table 4.3). 
 
 
Mechanisms 
Activation of positive and negative emotions 
For PANAS PA and NA (see Figure 4.3) there were significant effects of Time, all 
Fs(1, 74) > 35.10, ps  < .001, η²ps > .32, but no significant effects of Condition, all Fs(2, 74) < 
2.17, ps  > .121, η²ps < .05. While no significant interaction effect was found for PANAS NA, 
F(2, 74) = 0.57, p = .570, η²p = .02, a significant interaction emerged for PANAS PA, F(2, 74) 
= 9.29, p < .001, η²p = .20. Planned contrasts revealed that active treatments increased positive 
emotions more strongly compared to NIC (Mdiff  = -0.52, SD = 4.48), t(60.89) = 3.97, p < 
.001, d = 0.97, with ImRs (Mdiff = -7.36, SD = 6.81) leading to stronger increases than CR 
(Mdiff  = -3.52, SD = 5.35), t(45.54) = 2.25, p = .029, d = 0.62. For negative emotions, 
reductions emerged in all groups with no differences between conditions. Descriptive data are 
outlined in Table 4.2. Results for the remaining subscales of PANAS-X are provided in Table 
C.1 in the Supplementary Material.    
 
 
Figure 4.3. Effects of imagery rescripting (ImRs) vs. cognitive restructuring (CR) vs. no-
intervention control condition (NIC) on (a) positive emotions (PANAS PA), and (b) negative 
emotions (PANAS NA); t1: before the intervention; t2: after the intervention; Error bars 
represent SEM. 
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Intellectual and emotional beliefs 
Results per condition are illustrated in Figure 4.4. For intellectual beliefs, there was no 
significant effect of Condition, F(2, 74) = 1.00, p = .373, η²p = .03, but a significant effect of 
Time and a significant interaction effect, all Fs (3.63, 134.19 / 1.81, 134.19) > 6.12, ps < .001, 
η²ps > .14. Planned contrasts revealed that compared to NIC the active treatments led to 
stronger reductions in intellectual beliefs from pre- to post-intervention, t(55.43) = 4.58, p < 
.001, d = 1.12, and from pre to follow-up, t(74) = 2.13, p = .036, d = 0.52. While CR and 
ImRs equally reduced intellectual beliefs from pre- to post-intervention, t(35.93) = 2.03, p = 
.050, d = 0.49, CR led to stronger decreases than ImRs from pre to follow-up, t(74) = 3.04, p 
= .003, d = 0.84. 
For emotional beliefs, there were significant effects of Time and Condition, all Fs (2, 
74/ 2, 148) > 5.37, ps < .006, η²ps > .13, and a significant interaction effect, F(4, 148) = 13.94, 
p < .001, η²p = .27. Planned contrasts revealed that the active treatments reduced emotional 
beliefs more strongly than NIC from pre- to post-intervention, t(60.66) = 8.51, p < .001, d = 
2.07, and from pre to follow-up, t(69.14) = 5.62, p < .001, d = 1.37. CR and ImRs were 
equally effective in decreasing emotional beliefs from pre- to post-intervention, t(49.78) = 
0.16, p = .878, d = 0.04, but CR led to stronger reductions than ImRs from pre to follow-up, 
t(48.13) = 2.67, p = .010, d = 0.74.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Effects of imagery rescripting (ImRs) vs. cognitive restructuring (CR) vs. no-
intervention control condition (NIC) on (a) intellectual beliefs, and (b) emotional beliefs; t1: 
before the intervention; t2: after the intervention; t3: one-week follow-up; Error bars represent 
SEM. 
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Correlation between mechanisms and symptomatic change 
Within the ImRs group, symptomatic change was not significantly correlated with 
changes in emotions (PA x SIAS: r = -.08; PA x BFNE-R: r = .26; NA x SIAS: r = -.35; NA x 
BFNE-R: r = .11; all ps > .085). Also, there was no significant correlation between pre-post 
changes in emotional beliefs and symptomatic change (SIAS: r = -.39; BFNE-R: r = .15; all 
ps > .055).  
 
Habitual use of mental imagery and cognitive reappraisal strategies 
In ImRs, SUIS scores were neither significantly correlated with changes on SIAS, r = 
.02, p = .931, nor with changes on BFNE-R, r = .02, p = .919. For CR, there was a trend 
towards significant positive correlations between ERQ scores and changes on SIAS, r = .34, p 
= .081, and BFNE-R, r = .37, p = .057. 
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Discussion 
The present study examined the effects of ImRs versus CR for socially anxious 
individuals when compared to no intervention. The aim of the study was to 1) replicate the 
beneficial effects of stand-alone ImRs and CR on social anxiety symptoms within a 
subclinical sample, 2) extend previous research by investigating mechanisms underlying 
ImRs (i.e., activation of emotions and emotionally anchored reappraisal of idiosyncratic 
beliefs), and 3) explore factors that might be used to select treatment strategies for the 
individual patient. 
 
 
Effects on social anxiety symptoms 
Contrary to expectations, CR was superior to ImRs and NIC in reducing social 
interaction anxiety, with only CR yielding substantial improvements. No significant 
differences between groups were evident for fear of negative evaluation, but looking at the 
descriptive data there was a trend indicating that only CR led to substantial reductions 
(medium sized interaction effect). Previous findings regarding the effects of the interventions 
on responses to a social stressor could not be replicated (Norton & Abbott, 2016). When 
confronted with the speech task, participants in all conditions demonstrated equal reductions 
in distress, arousal, and negative appraisals suggesting that the active treatments had no 
benefits over and above mere exposure to the speech.  
Taken together, findings support previous evidence for the beneficial effects of one 
session of CR to reduce social anxiety symptoms (e.g., Norton & Abbott, 2016; Shikatani, 
Antony, Kuo, & Cassin, 2014). However, in the present subclinical sample promising earlier 
findings on the benefits of stand-alone ImRs for social anxiety could not be replicated 
(Nilsson et al., 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). Results for CR 
underline its efficacy within CBT for SAD, even when administered as a relatively short 
intervention (mean duration was 24min). Effect sizes for the superiority of CR compared to 
no treatment (and ImRs) were medium sized, but note that social anxiety symptoms remained 
above the clinical cut-off indicating that more sessions are necessary to achieve clinically 
significant improvements with CR (see also Norton & Abbott, 2016). Results for ImRs are 
surprising given that the present procedure was based on previous research (Nilsson et al., 
2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). In line with these earlier studies 
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one session of ImRs was delivered without cognitive preparation in a non-clinical setting with 
a 1-week follow-up.  
One possible explanation for the inconsistent findings might be that ImRs is more 
effective in individuals with more severe symptomatology. In the present study, a sample of 
highly socially anxious individuals was included (based on SIAS scores in the clinical range) 
whereas earlier studies investigated patients meeting diagnostic criteria for SAD (Nilsson et 
al., 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). For SAD patients, 
correlations between anxiety symptomatology and socially traumatic experiences have been 
found and there is evidence that these experiences play a role in the development of the 
disorder (Norton & Abbott, 2017; Simon et al., 2009). In individuals with subclinical 
symptoms negative self-images and -beliefs might potentially be not as strongly linked to 
salient traumatic experiences. Therefore, it might be more helpful to target aversive memories 
with ImRs in SAD patients, while subclinical samples appear to benefit more from CR, 
possibly as this intervention challenges self-beliefs more directly. However, it should be noted 
that mean baseline symptom levels (i.e., SIAS scores) of the present study were comparable 
or even higher than those reported in previous studies for patient samples (Nilsson et al., 
2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016), which makes differences in symptom severity a less likely 
explanation of the failure to replicate earlier treatment effects.  
An alternative explanation might be that the ImRs intervention, which was used in the 
present study, needs to be optimized to produce changes in social anxiety symptoms. First, it 
is possible that treatment intensity needs to be enhanced (mean duration of ImRs was 22 min 
in the present study). Moreover, a highly standardized ImRs protocol was used in the current 
study, whereas other studies administered the intervention in a more individualized way (e.g., 
Norton & Abbott, 2016). In the present study, all participants were instructed to introduce 
changes themselves (i.e., therapists were not actively involved in the rescripting of the 
memory), which may have reduced the efficacy of the intervention. As suggested in the ImRs 
protocol by Arntz and Weertman (1999) for traumatic childhood memories, it might be 
necessary to modify the standard ImRs procedure when individuals struggle to access the 
perspective of the healthy adult-self and feel too powerless to confront others in the image. In 
these cases, therapists are proposed to take a more active role by either making suggestions 
for possible interventions or entering the image to intervene themselves. In the ImRs protocol 
for SAD (Wild & Clark, 2011), this therapist-led variant has not explicitly been proposed, but 
observations from the present study indicate that it might be helpful in some cases, as the 
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accessibility of a healthy adult perspective varied between participants. Future research 
should explicitly compare the efficacy of different ImRs protocols (for SAD) such as 
therapist- versus patient-led approaches or patients imagining helpers versus the adult-self to 
intervene (see Siegesleitner, Strohm, Wittekind, Ehring, & Kunze, 2019b). 
Finally, in accordance with suggestions by Wild and Clark (2011), it might be necessary 
to administer ImRs in combination with CR (as done in Lee & Kwon, 2013; Wild et al., 
2008). The present results indicate that CR alone might be superior to ImRs alone and 
question the notion that ImRs yields stable effects across different samples when delivered 
without cognitive preparation. However, whether a combination of ImRs and CR could 
outperform CR alone should further be investigated in future studies. An advantage of 
combining CR and ImRs might be that in a first step cognitive preparation may support 
patients to make the healthy adult perspective more accessible and to generate adaptive 
beliefs. Next, these updated beliefs about the self and others could be incorporated during 
ImRs, thereby updating mental imagery and possibly anchoring alternative meanings 
emotionally.   
 
 
Mechanisms underlying imagery rescripting 
In line with the hypothesis on activation of emotions, ImRs led to stronger increases of 
positive emotions than CR and NIC. For negative emotions, however, significant reductions 
emerged with no differences between conditions. ImRs and CR both reduced intellectual and 
emotional beliefs from pre- to post-intervention when compared to NIC, but CR was more 
effective in the long-term. In ImRs, neither changes in positive emotions nor in emotional 
beliefs correlated with symptomatic outcomes. 
Findings for idiosyncratic self-beliefs (intellectual and emotional) and activation of 
positive emotions indicate that ImRs initiated the hypothesized beneficial (short-term) 
processes. Previous evidence for the more powerful impact of imagery interventions on 
positive emotions when compared with verbal processing, i.e. CR was replicated in the 
present study (Holmes & Mathews, 2010). The results further suggest that ImRs leads to 
emotionally anchored reappraisal of idiosyncratic beliefs in the short-term. However, as the 
intervention did not yield improvements on symptomatic outcome variables in the present 
study, it remains to be tested whether the aforementioned mechanisms play a role in 
producing symptomatic change. 
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Moreover, the present results challenge the notion that emotionally anchored reappraisal 
is a mechanism that is specific for ImRs. In fact, CR was also effective in targeting 
maladaptive emotional beliefs, disconfirming the theoretical idea that cognitive treatment 
strategies primarily change intellectual meaning levels (i.e., propositional level). Although CR 
reduced emotional beliefs in the present study, mean levels were still high at follow-up. From 
clinical experience, after having challenged beliefs verbally, a substantial number of patients 
report a discrepancy between rationally knowing (that their negative beliefs are not true) and 
feeling it deep inside. More systematic research is needed to test whether emotional beliefs 
can be further reduced with multiple sessions of CR, or whether ImRs might be more helpful 
or should be added when CR yields no substantial improvements.  
 
 
What works for whom? 
Participants who tended to habitually use mental imagery in daily life did not benefit 
from ImRs to a greater extent. This replicates previous evidence that the efficacy of ImRs 
does not depend on whether patients are used to operate in an imagery mode (McEvoy et al., 
2015). However, these results have to be interpreted with caution, as no overall treatment 
effect of ImRs was observed. For CR, there was a trend indicating that those individuals 
benefited more who habitually used cognitive reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy 
before treatment. This finding provides first evidence for a factor that might be used to make 
individualized treatment decisions. 
 
 
Limitations 
Results of the present study have to be interpreted in light of some limitations. ImRs 
and CR were delivered as brief interventions within a non-therapeutic setting. Thus, the 
interventions deviate from treatment as used in clinical practice (e.g., regarding therapeutic 
alliance, treatment intensity) limiting generalizability to clinical settings. As a subclinical 
sample was investigated, results cannot be generalized to patient populations. Emotional 
beliefs were rated on a one-item VAS, which might reduce reliability. Moreover, it is unclear 
whether changes in meaning representations on the implicational level can be measured via 
verbal ratings.  
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Conclusion  
The present study compared the effects of ImRs versus CR as stand-alone interventions 
for socially anxious individuals and was the first to systematically examine mechanisms 
underlying ImRs for social anxiety. Results underline the efficacy of a brief CR intervention 
to reduce social anxiety symptoms. The failure to replicate the benefits of ImRs in the present 
study points towards difficulties of administering ImRs as a brief stand-alone intervention 
within laboratory settings in sub-clinical samples. The present findings provide first evidence 
that ImRs indeed activates stronger positive emotions than CR, but results challenge the 
notion that emotionally anchored reappraisal is a working mechanism specific for ImRs. 
However, results on potential working mechanisms have to be interpreted with caution given 
that ImRs was not effective in reducing social anxiety symptoms. The present study raises the 
question how ImRs interventions for socially anxious individuals should optimally be 
implemented in laboratory-based research. A cognitive preparation phase, more 
individualized ImRs protocols, and/or higher treatment intensity might be necessary to yield 
therapeutic effects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. General Discussion 
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The present thesis aimed to examine mechanisms underlying imagery rescripting 
(ImRs) for aversive memories. Using an adapted analogue paradigm for the investigation of 
ImRs in aversive autobiographical memories, Study I and II tested whether ImRs enhances 
perceived mastery of distressing experiences (“memory revaluation”) and leads to a reduction 
of memory-related emotional and physiological responding. Study III compared the effects of 
ImRs versus cognitive restructuring (CR) in a subclinical sample of highly socially anxious 
individuals and addressed the question whether ImRs works through reappraisal of 
emotionally anchored dysfunctional beliefs. In the following, the main findings of the present 
thesis are summarized and future directions for research into working mechanisms of ImRs 
are discussed.  
 
 
Summary of results 
Psychological and physiological effects of imagery rescripting (Studies I and II) 
Study I and II of this thesis presented an analogue research approach which overcomes 
limitations of the trauma film paradigm (TFP; for reviews‚ see Holmes & Bourne, 2008; 
James et al., 2016) by using ImRs for aversive autobiographical memories of real-life events. 
In this way, the present studies aimed to provide an ecologically more valid model of the 
memories that are targeted with ImRs interventions in clinical practice. In both studies, the 
adapted analogue paradigm was used to test a mechanism that had been hypothesized to 
underlie ImRs: According to a proposition by Arntz (2012), ImRs might work by changing 
the dysfunctional meaning of the memory representation of the aversive event (“memory 
revaluation”) thereby reducing problematic emotional and physiological responses to the 
memory. The present studies specifically investigated whether ImRs leads to a revaluation of 
memory contents with respect to perceived mastery. Results only partially supported the 
hypothesized working mechanism. In Study I ImRs increased feelings of mastery of aversive 
life-events when compared to a no-intervention control condition (NIC) indicating that ImRs 
had led to a revaluation of the autobiographical memory contents. However, this treatment 
effect could unexpectedly not be replicated in Study II. With respect to emotional responding 
to memory retrieval, findings from both studies showed that subjectively reported memory 
distress and negative emotions can be reduced with ImRs. Importantly, changing meaning-
relevant contents of the original memory with ImRs was superior to a positive emotion 
regulation strategy (PI), which induced mental images and meanings related to positive life-
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events (Study II). However, it must be noted that different patterns of results were derived 
regarding the distinct emotional states, which had been successfully decreased with ImRs 
(Study I: sadness; Study II: helplessness). Regarding physiological reactivity to the memories 
(Study II), one brief ImRs session was not sufficient to yield reductions over and above mere 
exposure to the memory contents (NIC) or a positive emotion regulation strategy (PI).  
Taken together, Studies I and II of the present thesis extended previous laboratory 
research on ImRs in artificially induced aversive memories (e.g., Dibbets & Arntz 2016; 
Dibbets et al., 2018; Hagenaars & Arntz 2012; Kunze, Arntz, & Kindt, 2019) by 
demonstrating that ImRs changes the (subjective) emotional valence of autobiographical 
memory representations of real-life events. The question how reductions in negative 
emotional responding to the memory relate to changes in dysfunctional meanings about 
mastery could not be answered conclusively given the inconsistent results for perceived 
mastery. An investigation of ImRs for autobiographical memories within the presented 
paradigm appears to be promising, although modifications are necessary given that the 
clinical efficacy of ImRs could not be modelled reliably across both studies. In Study I 
beneficial effects of ImRs on intrusive memory frequency emerged, however, the 
interpretation of results was limited as intrusive memories were assessed differently at 
baseline and post-intervention. An investigation of treatment effects on other 
psychopathological symptoms (e.g., event-related stress symptoms as assessed with the 
Impact of Event Scale-Revised and Response to Script Driven Imagery Scale) was impeded 
by floor effects. In order to address this limitation, Study III examined effects and 
mechanisms of ImRs in a subclinical sample of highly socially anxious individuals reporting 
symptoms of social anxiety above the clinical cut-off score at baseline. 
 
 
Imagery rescripting for social anxiety: the role of emotionally anchored reappraisal  
(Study III) 
Clinical research in the context of ImRs treatment has largely focused on patient 
samples reporting (early) aversive memories which are strongly linked to dysfunctional 
beliefs or schemas (e.g., Arntz, 2011; Arntz & Weertman, 1999; Wild & Clark, 2011). 
Therefore, Study III of the present thesis investigated the effects and working mechanisms of 
ImRs in a sample of highly socially anxious individuals reporting memories of early stressful 
social experiences, which were associated with dysfunctional beliefs about the self and/or 
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others. In the context of social anxiety disorder (SAD), it has been suggested that ImRs as an 
imagery-based intervention specifically works by reducing dysfunctional emotional beliefs 
(i.e. beliefs on the implicational meaning level, “felt beliefs”; see Nilsson et al., 2012; Norton 
& Abbott, 2016; Wild et al., 2008). However, findings from Study III did not support this 
hypothesis. Although results showed that ImRs indeed led to a reappraisal of dysfunctional 
emotional beliefs at post-intervention, CR was equally effective in reducing emotional beliefs 
and was even superior to ImRs in the longer-term (1-week follow-up). This result was 
surprising given that activation of positive emotions through ImRs was – as expected – 
stronger compared to CR. With respect to the proposed working mechanism, the present 
results therefore challenged the notion that emotionally anchored reappraisal might be a 
mechanism specific for ImRs. In fact, verbal interventions like CR appear to also target 
emotional beliefs. However, as one brief session of ImRs was investigated and as outcomes 
were assessed after a relatively short follow-up period, more research into the long-term 
effects of more intense ImRs versus CR treatment is needed. Moreover, it is important to note 
that the clinical efficacy of ImRs to reduce social anxiety symptoms (Nilsson et al., 2012; 
Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015) could not be replicated in the 
subclinical sample. The failure to model the benefits of ImRs on symptomatic outcomes in the 
laboratory setting limited the interpretation of results on potential working mechanisms and 
indicated that it appears to be necessary to optimize the ImRs protocol used in this study.  
 
 
Implications for future research  
This thesis presented different laboratory-based research approaches to investigate 
working mechanisms of ImRs in non-clinical samples. Findings from the current studies add 
to our knowledge on processes that might underlie the therapeutic efficacy of ImRs, although 
only preliminary conclusions can be drawn about potential working mechanisms. Findings on 
the effects of ImRs on symptomatic outcomes were rather mixed in the present analogue 
samples raising the question how the clinical efficacy of ImRs can be best modelled within 
laboratory-based research. The following chapter outlines potentials and limitations of the 
laboratory-based approach in the context of ImRs. Moreover, future directions for research 
into working mechanisms and into the optimization of ImRs interventions are discussed. 
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Investigating ImRs in laboratory-based analogue studies 
The present analogue studies allowed to examine treatment mechanisms of ImRs in a 
highly controlled and standardized setting thereby minimizing the influence of confounding 
variables. However, several limitations of the introduced paradigms emerged, which need to 
be taken into account by future laboratory-based research in this field.  
One major limitation of the present studies was that symptomatic change could not be 
consistently achieved in non-clinical samples. However, for a better understanding of 
mechanisms underlying psychological interventions it is crucial to examine the link between 
the hypothesized mechanisms and symptomatic change, for example, via mediational analyses 
(Kazdin, 2007). Due to floor effects on clinical symptom questionnaires an investigation of 
treatment effects of psychological interventions can be constrained in healthy samples (see 
Study I and II). Future research is therefore recommended to select individuals who exceed a 
priori defined cut-offs of symptom severity (as done in Study III). Alternatively, it might be 
worthwhile to specifically focus on certain psychopathological phenomena, such as intrusive 
memories, which (in milder forms) have been shown to be very common in healthy 
populations after highly emotional experiences (Marks et al., 2018). In a similar vein, findings 
from the present thesis have raised the question how ImRs needs to be optimally delivered in 
laboratory-based studies to provide an effective and ecologically valid model of clinical 
ImRs. The following issues might be worthwhile to consider in future analogue studies: First, 
ImRs is usually delivered over several sessions in patients and with a longer duration (mean 
duration of ImRs in the present studies: 14 - 22 min). Second, non-clinical samples may differ 
significantly from clinical, treatment-seeking populations regarding their lower treatment 
motivation and willingness to change, which may adversely affect therapeutic outcome of 
analogue ImRs. As ImRs is a highly emotion-evoking intervention this might additionally 
foster avoidance motivation of participants in non-clinical settings. Finally, laboratory-based 
interventions are usually administered without building up a therapeutic relationship, which 
may also be critical for therapeutic success within analogue settings (Bordin, 1994). Future 
studies need to test whether enhanced treatment intensity, more specific inclusion criteria 
(e.g., treatment motivation), allowing time for participants to become familiar with the 
experimental setting and/or integrating some of the key elements of the therapeutic alliance 
(e.g., by administering ImRs in Session 2 to give participants more time to develop a 
collaborative relationship of confidence; see Bordin, 1994) might solve these issues in future 
studies.  
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Although modelling the effects of ImRs on psychopathological symptoms in non-
clinical samples appears to be challenging, analogue studies still have the potential to inform 
clinical research about treatment processes that might be involved in ImRs. Findings from the 
present thesis indicated that laboratory-based studies could be a suitable means to further 
examine effects of ImRs on different aspects of aversive autobiographical memories (e.g., 
which memory-related emotions can be reduced with ImRs? How can different emotions, 
such as guilt or shame, be optimally addressed with ImRs? Does ImRs change other types of 
meanings than perceived mastery? Does ImRs reduce the vividness of the memory? Does 
ImRs change factual details of the episodic memory?). Additionally, analogue studies might 
be promising to compare the effects of different variants of ImRs on the emotional valence of 
the memory (e.g., how much emotional activation is needed? Is it beneficial to rescript the 
memory in a way, that the aversive experience is prevented from happening? Is it helpful to 
take revenge within imagery? How important is it to switch perspective from the past/younger 
self to the current/ adult self during ImRs?). Moreover, laboratory-based research might be a 
valuable means to compare treatment mechanisms of ImRs and well-established interventions 
for aversive memories such as exposure-based therapies or Eye Movement and 
Desensitization Reprocessing (e.g., is ImRs superior in reducing non-fear emotions?).  
Finally, it is important to note that in order to answer the question whether ImRs is an 
effective treatment to reduce symptoms in patients with different emotional disorders, it is 
undoubtedly necessary to additionally carry out studies in clinical samples (see also van den 
Hout et al., 2017). Nevertheless, laboratory-based studies in subclinical samples might be 
used for a preliminary investigation of ImRs effects for specific psychopathological problems 
or diagnostic categories, which have not been targeted with ImRs in the current literature 
(e.g., for a preliminary evaluation of adapted ImRs protocols that can then be tested in clinical 
case series; for a similar approach, see Tolgou et al., 2018).   
 
 
Future directions for research into working mechanisms of ImRs 
In addition to the aforementioned methodological implications, the present thesis points 
towards a number of open questions which are worthwhile to examine in future research for a 
better understanding of working mechanisms of ImRs. Findings of this thesis principally 
supported previous evidence that ImRs may work by changing dysfunctional meanings of 
aversive memories (e.g. Arntz, 2012; Kunze, 2018; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). However, it 
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needs to be further investigated, which types of meanings may be addressed with the 
intervention, how ImRs is optimally delivered to change memory-related meanings and how 
ImRs works on the level of memory processes.  
 
Changing dysfunctional meanings of autobiographical memories with ImRs  
Study I supported the notion that providing positive meanings regarding perceived 
mastery might play a role in ImRs interventions (see Germain et al., 2004; Kunze et al. 2016; 
Kunze et al., 2019; Long & Quevillon, 2009). In this regard, future studies should test 
whether a revaluation of memory contents of concrete (past) autobiographical life-events have 
generalized effects on fundamental beliefs about mastery (or self-efficacy) in future 
demanding or anxiety-provoking situations. Changing these more generalized dysfunctional 
beliefs about mastery might be crucial to reduce avoidance behavior and memory-related 
symptoms with the intervention. In a similar vein, it might be important to examine whether 
enhanced mastery during deliberate memory retrieval is associated with increased mastery of 
intrusive memory contents (Long & Quevillon 2009). Moreover, findings from this thesis 
indicate that it is relevant to further investigate how ImRs needs to be delivered in order to 
successfully enhance mastery. In Study II the positive effects of ImRs on mastery were not 
replicated and this might potentially be explained by the fact that participants rescripted their 
life-events in a way that rather included helpers changing the situation than themselves being 
actively intervening in the image. In a recent study, we are therefore specifically testing 
whether therapists should stimulate patients to imagine themselves intervening or whether it 
suffice to use helpers to change the situation in order to exert effects on perceived mastery 
(Siegesleitner et al., 2019b). In a similar vein, it has not been examined to which extent 
therapists should be involved in developing the new script during ImRs. To enhance 
perceived mastery it might be optimal for patients to rescript the sequence of events 
themselves, as this might be associated with the strongest increases in controllability and self-
efficacy. On the other hand, observations from Study III indicated that (socially anxious) 
individuals sometimes struggled to carry out positive changes from the adult’s perspective 
when the adult self did not feel strong enough to confront others in the image. In order to 
increase mastery in these individuals, it might be necessary that – in a first step – therapists 
develop the new script by entering the image and introducing more positive outcomes. The 
latter approach has also been suggested for patients with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
who feel too powerless to intervene in the image (Arntz & Weertman, 1999). Additional 
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research is clearly needed to compare these patient- versus therapist-led ImRs approaches 
regarding their effects on mastery and symptomatic change. 
While providing corrective information about mastery during ImRs might be one 
possibility to change the negative meaning of aversive autobiographical memories, it is 
conceivable that ImRs works by addressing different types of meanings as well. In patients 
with SAD, ImRs primarily aims to reduce negatively distorted mental images of the social 
self by generating more positive outcomes of originally aversive social experiences (see Study 
III), such as mental images of supportive others. In this way, ImRs has indeed been found to 
change memory-related dysfunctional meanings (or beliefs) about the self (e.g., “I am 
worthless”) and others (e.g., “Other people will be judgmental and reject me”) in patients with 
SAD (Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015). In patients with PTSD, memory-
associated meanings typically include appraisals about serious current threat, which can be 
either external (e.g., “The world is a dangerous place”) or internal (e.g., a threat to one's self 
concept as an acceptable or capable person; see Ehlers & Clark, 2000). In addition to offering 
corrective information about mastery (or controllability), ImRs might address these negative 
meanings by providing mental images of the individual being safe and/or the traumatized self 
being reassured (e.g., Arntz, 2012; Hackmann, 2011). Finally, depending on the respective 
life-event and the diagnostic status negative memory-related meanings may extremely differ 
between individuals. Future research into working mechanism of ImRs is therefore 
recommended to assess memory-related meanings more comprehensively using disorder 
specific questionnaires on dysfunctional cognitions or an assessment of memory-related 
idiosyncratic meanings (e.g., Moscovitch et al., 2011).  
 
Improving ImRs treatment  
Findings from Study III raised the question how ImRs is optimally delivered to change 
memory-related meanings given that the intervention did not yield sustainable change in 
dysfunctional beliefs (neither on the emotional nor on the intellectual level). In this regard, 
systematic comparisons of the effects of stand-alone ImRs versus a combination of CR and 
ImRs might be informative. Although imagery-based interventions have been suggested to 
have potential benefits over verbal interventions in addressing dysfunctional meanings, 
findings from Study III and from a previous study by Norton and Abbott (2016) demonstrated 
that one session of CR was superior to stand-alone ImRs in reducing negative self-beliefs. In 
contrast, there is also evidence that dysfunctional beliefs can be successfully reduced with 
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stand-alone ImRs (i.e., without deliberate cognitive restructuring; Nilsson et al., 2012; Reimer 
& Moscovitch, 2015). Future studies should clarify the need to explicitly reappraise memory-
related meanings as part of ImRs interventions. Adding a preparation phase of cognitive 
restructuring before administering ImRs (as suggested in the protocol for SAD by Wild & 
Clark, 2011) might augment the therapeutic efficacy because dysfunctional beliefs are first 
challenged in a very explicit way (during CR) and newly developed adaptive meanings can 
then be incorporated in the memory during ImRs.  
Alternatively, it is possible that ImRs does not work by (deliberate) cognitive 
revaluation of meanings, but rather by providing corrective emotional experiences. According 
to a recent account by Lane, Ryan, Nadel, and Greenberg (2015), therapeutic change occurs 
by activating autobiographical memories and the associated emotions and by incorporating 
corrective emotional elements into the memory structure. Based on evidence that event-
memories and semantic memory structures are interactive (Ryan, Hoscheidt, & Nadel, 2008), 
it has been suggested that the updating of aversive memories through new experiences will 
lead to the development of new semantic structures (i.e., rules, beliefs; Lane et al., 2015). If 
the aforementioned working mechanism applied to ImRs, treatment efficacy might be 
augmented by supporting patients to emotionally engage in the intervention and to focus on 
the corrective emotional experience during the rescripting of the memory (rather than 
explicitly reappraising beliefs during ImRs). In this regard, it might also be relevant to further 
explore to which extent the original memory needs to be emotionally activated and how much 
exposure to the aversive memory contents is needed before the rescripting phase is initiated. 
On the one hand, it has been proposed that activated emotional arousal and the expectation of 
the upcoming trauma may suffice (e.g., Arntz, 2015; Arntz & Weertman, 1999). On the other 
hand, preliminary results indicate that ImRs might be more effective when the rescripting of 
the memory is initiated after the most aversive scenes of the memory has been relived 
(including the hotspot) before the memory is changed (Dibbets & Arntz, 2016). Relatedly, it 
appears to be important to explore the impact of (imaginal) exposure to the aversive memory 
contents as an active treatment component of ImRs interventions. Dismantling studies may 
contribute to a better understanding of the active treatment ingredients of ImRs and their 
impact on symptomatic outcomes (see also Kunze, 2018).  
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Memory processes underlying ImRs  
This thesis showed that ImRs changes the emotional quality of aversive memories and 
reduces memory-related dysfunctional meanings. However, it remains an open question how 
exactly ImRs works on the level of memory processes. Two distinct mechanisms have been 
suggested in this regard. On the one hand, ImRs might directly modify the original memory 
representation by activating the memory and updating it during memory reconsolidation 
(Arntz, 2012; Kunze, 2018). On the other hand, ImRs might generate an alternative, positively 
valenced memory trace which then competes with the original aversive memory 
representation for retrieval (see retrieval competition theory, Brewin, 2006). The experimental 
procedures of Studies I and II were designed to initiate memory reconsolidation processes 
(see James et al., 2015), but they did not allow to explicitly test whether ImRs indeed updated 
the memories during reconsolidation. If ImRs indeed was a means to interfere with memory 
reconsolidation processes and to directly change the averseness of the original memory 
representation, this could promote the generalization of treatment effects to different contexts 
outside the treatment setting. In this way, ImRs might reduce relapse rates compared to 
contingency-based exposure interventions, which keep the valence of the original event 
memory unchanged and therefore typically have to be repeated in many different contexts 
(Arntz, 2012; Kunze et al., 2019).   
Although evidence for successful memory updating during reconsolidation is still 
limited for psychological interventions, the investigation of memory updating via 
reconsolidation appears to be an important avenue of research in clinical psychology given 
the pathogenic role of aversive memories in a number of emotional disorders (Beckers & 
Kindt, 2017). As memory updating via reconsolidation depends on a number of parameters, 
future research should also clarify under which conditions ImRs may initiate memory 
reconsolidation processes and under which conditions it rather facilitates the formation of an 
alternative memory trace (see also Kunze, 2018). In this regard, the duration of exposure to 
the original memory appears to be crucial, indicating that the extent of memory reactivation 
needs to be optimized before the rescripting is initiated (e.g., Suzuki et al., 2004). Moreover, 
there is evidence that a prediction error (i.e., a discrepancy between the actual and the 
expected outcome) is needed to destabilize a memory (Exton-McGuinness, Lee, & Reichelt, 
2015). Thus, it appears to be crucial that expectancies are violated during memory retrieval 
for memory reconsolidation to occur. During ImRs expectancies might be violated when the 
feared outcome of the aversive event does not occur in imagery. However, it needs to be 
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tested whether this involves preventing the hotspot from happening during ImRs or whether 
the rescripting of the sequence of events may be also initiated after the hotspot has been 
reactivated (see also Kunze, 2018). More research is clearly needed to clarify whether and 
how ImRs might update memories via reconsolidation processes. 
 
 
What works for whom? 
In order to enhance the efficacy of psychological treatments, it is not only important to 
understand processes of change, but also to identify factors that need to be taken into account 
to tailor interventions to patients’ characteristics (Norcross & Wampold, 2011). Findings from 
Study III indicated that participants who tended to habitually use mental imagery in daily life 
did not benefit from ImRs to a greater extent (see also McEvoy et al., 2015). However, the 
literature is still inconclusive regarding the question whether an individual’s ability to 
generate mental images influences treatment outcomes (Hunt & Fenton, 2007; Lee & Kwon, 
2013; McEvoy et al., 2015). Moreover, it is conceivable that the patient’s openness for 
emotion evoking experiential interventions may impact the therapeutic efficacy of ImRs. 
Finally, the present thesis was based on recent accounts considering ImRs as a rather 
homogenous therapeutic intervention, which may be applied transdiagnostically with largely 
uniform treatment mechanisms across disorders (see e.g., Arntz, 2012; Morina et al., 2017). 
However, until now it is an open empirical question whether different treatment protocols 
introduced under the term imagery rescripting indeed are variants of the same clinical 
intervention or whether ImRs may be (re-)defined as a collection of imagery-based 
interventions with differential working mechanisms for different forms of psychopathology. 
Future research into ImRs should therefore aim to answer the question which variant of ImRs 
works best to modify which kind of psychopathological processes in which groups of patients. 
 
 
Conclusion 
To augment the efficacy of psychological treatments it is crucial to understand how 
therapeutic change occurs. This thesis introduced different laboratory-based research 
approaches to investigate working mechanisms of ImRs for aversive autobiographical 
memories. The present findings extended previous experimental research by showing that 
ImRs changes the emotional quality of autobiographical memories as well as memory-related 
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dysfunctional meanings. The question whether an increase of perceived mastery constitutes a 
working mechanism of ImRs needs to be further investigated. Additional research is also 
needed to clarify how findings from the present laboratory studies translate to ImRs for 
traumatic memories in clinical populations. Although no final conclusions about the working 
mechanisms of ImRs can be drawn yet, the present thesis adds to our knowledge of potentials 
and limitations of laboratory-based research for the investigation of processes involved in 
ImRs. A better understanding of mechanisms underlying therapeutic change will be an 
important step towards optimized and more effective ImRs interventions for the treatment of 
emotional disorders associated with aversive autobiographical memories.  
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Imagery rescripting (ImRs) ist eine imaginationsbasierte therapeutische Technik, die an 
belastenden autobiographischen Erinnerungen ansetzt, um psychopathologische Symptome 
bei verschiedenen psychischen Störungen zu reduzieren (Arntz, 2012; Holmes, Arntz, & 
Smucker, 2007). Beim ImRs werden Patient*innen zunächst dazu angeleitet, sich die 
belastende oder traumatische Erinnerung möglichst lebendig vorzustellen. In einem zweiten 
Schritt werden die Erinnerungen dann in der Imagination verändert, indem die negativen 
inneren Bilder in positivere umgewandelt werden. Ziel des ImRs ist es, die dysfunktionale 
Bedeutung von belastenden Erfahrungen zu verändern und dadurch intrusive Bilder, 
dysfunktionale Kognitionen sowie negative Emotionen zu reduzieren (Arntz, 2012; Morina, 
Lancee, & Arntz, 2017). ImRs wurde ursprünglich zur Behandlung von psychischen 
Störungen nach früher Traumatisierung in der Kindheit oder Jugend entwickelt (Arntz & 
Weertman, 1999; Smucker, Dancu, Foa, & Niederee, 1995), jedoch wurde das 
Anwendungsgebiet in den letzten Jahren deutlich erweitert. ImRs-Interventionen wurden 
seither in der Kognitiven Verhaltenstherapie verschiedener psychischer Störungen 
angewendet, wie beispielsweise zur Behandlung von Posttraumatischer Belastungsstörung 
(Arntz, Tiesma, & Kindt, 2007; Grunert, Weis, Smucker, & Christianson, 2007; Øktedalen, 
Hoffart, & Langkaas, 2015; Raabe, Ehring, Marquenie, Olff, & Kindt, 2015), sozialer 
Angststörung (z.B. Hyett et al., 2018; Lee & Kwon, 2013; McEvoy & Saulsman, 2014; 
Nilsson, Lundh, & Viborg, 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Reimer & Moscovitch, 2015; Wild 
& Clark, 2011), Depression (z.B., Brewin et al., 2009; Moritz et al., 2018), 
Persönlichkeitsstörungen (z.B. Arntz, 2011; Weertman & Arntz, 2007), sowie zur 
Behandlung von Alpträumen (z.B. Kunze, Arntz, Morina, Kindt, & Lancee, 2017).  
Obwohl es Unterschiede zwischen den in verschiedenen Studien verwendeten Manualen 
gibt, stimmen die ImRs-Varianten in der grundlegenden Vorgehensweise überein, dass 
negative innere Bilder gemäß der individuellen Bedürfnisse der Patient*innen in hilfreichere 
Bilder umgewandelt werden (für einen Überblick siehe Holmes et al., 2007). Das häufig 
verwendete Manual nach Arntz und Weertman (1999) zur Behandlung von frühen 
traumatischen Erinnerungen unterteilt ImRs in die folgenden Phasen: In Phase 1 wird die 
Erinnerung emotional aktiviert, indem die damalige Situation aus der Perspektive des Kindes 
möglichst lebendig visualisiert wird. In Phase 2 werden die Patient*innen dazu angeleitet sich 
vorzustellen, dass sie als erwachsenes Ich die Situation betreten und zunächst beobachten, 
was dem Kind passiert. Darauffolgend wird das erwachsene Ich aufgefordert in der 
vorgestellten Situation zu intervenieren beispielsweise indem der/die Täter*in konfrontiert 
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und entmachtet und das Kind gerettet und unterstützt wird. In Phase 3 nehmen die 
Patient*innen nochmals die Perspektive des Kindes ein und erleben zunächst die in Phase 2 
vom erwachsenen Ich durchgeführten Veränderungen der Situation. Zudem werden die 
Patient*innen dazu ermutigt, weitere noch offene Bedürfnisse oder Wünsche aus der 
Perspektive des Kindes zu verbalisieren (z.B. Trost, Ablenkung).  
Ergebnisse einer aktuellen Meta-Analyse zeigen, dass ImRs-Interventionen eine 
wirksame Technik zur Behandlung verschiedener psychischer Störungen darstellen (Morina 
et al., 2017). Obwohl ImRs auf Grundlage der aktuellen Forschungsliteratur als 
vielversprechender transdiagnostischer Behandlungsansatz betrachtet werden kann, ist noch 
wenig über die zugrundeliegenden Wirkmechanismen bekannt.  
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es daher, Wirkmechanismen von ImRs zu untersuchen. 
Analogstudien mit gesunden oder subklinischen Stichproben gelten als ein geeigneter 
Forschungsansatz, um in einem hochstandardisierten und kontrollierten Setting Mechanismen 
zu beleuchten, welche psychotherapeutischen Interventionen zugrunde liegen könnten 
(Scheveneels, Boddez, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2016; Van den Hout, Engelhard, & McNally, 
2017). In Analogstudien werden psychopathologische Prozesse und deren therapeutische 
Behandlung bei gesunden Stichproben im Laborsetting modelliert, um eine systematische 
Untersuchung von Wirkprozessen auf zeit- und kosteneffektive Art und Weise zu erlauben 
(Scheveneels et al., 2016; Vervliet & Raes, 2013). Analogstudien im Bereich der ImRs-
Forschung nutzten bislang hauptsächlich das sogenannte Traumafilm-Paradigma (TFP; für 
eine Übersicht siehe Holmes & Bourne, 2008; James et al., 2016), in welchem durch 
aversives Filmmaterial belastende Erinnerungen und Stresssymptome induziert werden, 
welche dann mit therapeutischen Interventionen verändert werden können (z.B. Dibbets & 
Arntz 2016; Dibbets, Lemmens, & Voncken, 2018; Hagenaars & Arntz 2012). Eine 
Einschränkung des TFP ist jedoch, dass die persönliche Relevanz der induzierten 
Erinnerungen begrenzt ist, da sie keine selbst-erlebten Ereignisse mit weitreichender 
Bedeutung für das Individuum umfassen. Außerdem enthalten Film-induzierte Erinnerungen 
typischerweise keine negativen Kognitionen über die eigene Person und sind selten mit 
Emotionen wie Schuld oder Scham assoziiert, die aber bei psychischen Störungen häufig eine 
große Rolle spielen (z.B. Beck et al., 2011; Kim, Thibodeau, & Jorgensen, 2011; Lee, Scragg, 
& Turner, 2001).  
Um diesen Limitationen zu begegnen, wurde in der vorliegenden Arbeit eine Reihe von 
Analogstudien mit alternativen Untersuchungsparadigmen durchgeführt. Mögliche 
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Wirkmechanismen von ImRs wurden dabei im Kontext autobiographischer Erinnerungen an 
belastenden Lebensereignissen untersucht. Die betrachteten Erinnerungen sollten somit ein 
ökologisch valideres Modell jener Erinnerungen darstellen, welche in der klinischen Praxis 
mit ImRs behandelt werden.  
Ziel von Studie I war es einerseits, ein neu entwickeltes Paradigma zur Untersuchung von 
ImRs bei autobiographischen Erinnerungen zu evaluieren. Zudem umfasste die Studie eine 
erste Untersuchung möglicher Wirkmechanismen von ImRs: Es wurde getestet, ob ImRs zu 
einer Veränderung der dysfunktionalen Bedeutung der Erinnerung („memory revaluation“; 
siehe Arntz, 2012) in Bezug auf das subjektive Kontrollerleben führt und negative Emotionen 
beim Erinnerungsabruf reduziert werden. Gesunde Studienteilnehmer*innen (N = 65), welche 
in den vergangenen 24 Monaten ein belastendes Lebensereignis erlebt hatten, wurden zufällig 
dem ImRs oder einer Kontrollgruppe ohne Intervention (KG) zugewiesen. Die aversive 
Erinnerung an das Lebensereignis wurde vor der Intervention/KG und zum Follow-up nach 
einer Woche reaktiviert, um die emotionale Reaktion beim Erinnerungsabruf zu erheben. 
Ebenso wurde die Belastungssymptomatik vor der Intervention und zum Follow-up-Zeitpunkt 
gemessen. Zusätzlich führten die Studienteilnehmer*innen ein Intrusionstagebuch während 
der einwöchigen Follow-up-Periode. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass die ImRs Gruppe weniger 
Intrusionen in der Woche nach der Intervention berichteten, jedoch war ImRs der KG bei der 
Reduktion der allgemeinen Belastungssymptomatik zum Follow-up Zeitpunkt nicht 
überlegen. Beim Erinnerungsabruf nach einer Woche berichtete die ImRs Gruppe eine 
stärkere Abnahme an Traurigkeit und Belastung sowie ein größeres Kontrollerleben als die 
KG.  
In Studie II wurde das dargestellte Analogstudiendesgin aus Studie I optimiert, indem 
neben Selbstauskunftsmaßen auch die Messung physiologischer Reaktionen integriert wurde. 
Ziel der Studie war es, die Effekte von ImRs auf das subjektive Kontrollerleben und die 
emotionale Reaktion beim Erinnerungsabruf (siehe Studie I) unter Einbezug einer 
zusätzlichen aktiven Kontrollbedingung zu replizieren. Zudem hatte Studie II zum Ziel den 
bisherigen Forschungsstand zu erweitern, indem untersucht wurde, ob ImRs die 
physiologische Reaktion beim Erinnerungsabruf abschwächt. Gesunde 
Studienteilnehmer*innen (N = 79), welche Erinnerungen an ein belastendes Lebensereignis 
der letzten 24 Monate berichteten, wurden zufällig dem ImRs, einer positiven 
Imaginationsübung (PI) oder der KG zugewiesen. Die subjektive emotionale Reaktion sowie 
die physiologische Reaktion beim Erinnerungsabruf (Herzrate, elektrodermale Aktivität und 
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Elektromyographie) wurden vor der Intervention (bzw. PI, KG) und zum Follow-up nach 
einer Woche erhoben. Erwartungskonform führte ImRs zu einer größeren Abnahme der 
Belastung und negativen Emotionalität (Hilflosigkeit) beim Erinnerungsabruf als PI und KG. 
Jedoch war ImRs entgegen der Hypothese den Kontrollgruppen bei der Erhöhung des 
Kontrollerlebens nicht überlegen. Es wurde eine reduzierte physiologische Reaktion beim 
Erinnerungsabruf zum Follow-up Zeitpunkt festgestellt, wobei sich hier keine 
Gruppenunterschiede zeigten. 
Die Ergebnisse der Studien I und II unterstützten die Annahme, dass ImRs zu einer 
Veränderung der (subjektiven) negativen emotionalen Qualität der Erinnerung führt (siehe 
Arntz, 2012). Die Frage, inwieweit die Erhöhung des Kontrollerlebens eine Rolle als 
Wirkmechanismus von ImRs spielt konnte aufgrund der dargestellten Befunde jedoch nicht 
eindeutig beantwortet werden. Ebenso bedarf es weiterer Forschung bezüglich der Effekte des 
ImRs auf durch die Erinnerung ausgelöste physiologische Reaktionen. Der vorgestellte 
analoge Forschungsansatz erscheint vielversprechend für zukünftige Forschung, jedoch sind 
Anpassungen notwendig um die klinische Wirksamkeit des ImRs auf Symptomebene reliabler 
abbilden zu können. 
Um die Effekte des ImRs auf psychopathologische Symptome in einer analogen 
Stichprobe besser modellieren zu können, wurde in Studie III eine subklinische Stichprobe 
mit hoher Ausprägung sozialer Ängstlichkeit rekrutiert. Ziel von Studie III war es, einen 
weiteren potentiellen Wirkmechanismus von ImRs zu untersuchen: Verschiedene Autoren 
nehmen an, dass ImRs als imaginationsbasiertes Verfahren speziell über die Umbewertung 
dysfunktionaler emotionaler Überzeugungen wirken könnte („emotionally anchored 
reappraisal of dysfunctional beliefs“; siehe Nilsson et al., 2012; Norton & Abbott, 2016; Wild 
et al., 2008). Innere Bilder haben einen starken Einfluss auf emotionales Erleben und es wird 
daher vermutet, dass hilfreiche Bewertungen, die in der Form von Bilder generiert werden, 
emotional stärker verankert werden und glaubhafter sind als Bewertungen, die als rein verbale 
Repräsentationen dargeboten werden, zum Beispiel durch verbal-kognitive Interventionen wie 
der kognitiven Umstrukturierung (KU; Holmes & Mathews, 2010). Studie III untersuchte 
daher einerseits, ob ImRs zu einer Umbewertung dysfunktionaler emotionaler Überzeugungen 
führt und hatte andererseits zum Ziel, vorherige Befunde zu den Effekten des ImRs im 
Vergleich zur KU zu replizieren (Norton & Abbott, 2016). Hoch sozial ängstliche 
Proband*innen (N = 77) wurden zufällig einer Sitzung ImRs, KU oder einer KG (ohne 
Intervention) zugewiesen. Symptome sozialer Angst sowie idiosynkratische dysfunktionale 
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Überzeugungen (auf emotionaler und intellektueller Ebene) wurden vor den Interventionen 
(bzw. der KG) und zum Follow-up nach einer Woche erhoben. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass 
nur KU zu einer Abnahme von Symptomen sozialer Angst führte. Obwohl ImRs mit einer 
stärkeren Aktivierung positiver Emotionen während der Intervention einherging, berichteten 
Proband*innen der KU zum Follow-up einen stärkeren Rückgang emotionaler 
dysfunktionaler Überzeugungen. Damit konnten die vorliegenden Befunde die Annahme nicht 
unterstützen, dass eine Umbewertung dysfunktionaler emotionaler Überzeugungen ein 
Prozess ist, der speziell dem ImRs zugrunde liegt. Die Interpretation der Ergebnisse in Bezug 
auf mögliche Wirkmechanismen war jedoch eingeschränkt, da die klinische Wirksamkeit des 
ImRs auf Symptomebene in der untersuchten subklinischen Stichprobe nicht repliziert werden 
konnte. 
Ziel der vorliegenden Arbeit war es, mit Hilfe verschiedener Analogstudien die Effekte 
und Wirkmechanismen von ImRs zu untersuchen. Dabei wurde den Limitationen vorheriger 
experimenteller Studien begegnet, indem ImRs im Kontext autobiographischer Erinnerungen 
an belastende Lebensereignisse untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass ImRs die Belastung 
beim Abruf aversiver autobiographischer Erinnerungen reduziert und negative Emotionen im 
Zusammenhang mit der Erinnerung abschwächt. Obwohl die vorgestellten Studien noch keine 
endgültigen Schlussfolgerungen über die dem ImRs zugrunde liegenden Wirkmechanismen 
erlaubten, lieferten sie dennoch neue Erkenntnisse über Untersuchungsparadigmen, die für 
zukünftige Forschung in diesem Bereich vielversprechend zu sein scheinen. Die vorliegende 
Arbeit stellte Implikationen für zukünftige Forschung zu Wirkmechanismen von ImRs-
Interventionen dar und diskutierte das Potential und die Limitationen von Analogstudien im 
Bereich der ImRs-Forschung. 
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Imagery Rescripting of Aversive Autobiographical Memories: Effects on Memory Distress, 
Emotions, and Feelings of Mastery 
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Figure A.1. Distributions of levels of negative emotions (anxiety, anger, shame, guilt, 
sadness, disgust) after memory reactivation (t1). 
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Figure A.2. Effects of imagery rescripting (ImRs) vs. no-intervention control condition (NIC) 
on negative emotions; t1: after memory reactivation task at baseline (before the intervention); 
t5: after memory reactivation task at follow-up (1 week after the intervention).
Appendix A 
146 
 
T
a
b
le
 A
.1
. 
 
N
eg
at
iv
e 
em
o
ti
o
n
s:
 M
ea
n
s,
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s,
 m
ai
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
, 
an
d
 i
n
te
ra
ct
io
n
 e
ff
ec
ts
. 
  
  
G
ro
u
p
 
  
B
as
el
in
e 
(t
1
) 
  
F
o
ll
o
w
 u
p
 (
t5
) 
  
M
ai
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
  
  
In
te
ra
ct
io
n
 e
ff
ec
t 
  
  
  
  
M
 (
S
D
) 
  
M
 (
S
D
) 
  
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 F
(1
,6
3
) 
T
im
e 
F
(1
,6
3
) 
  
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
 x
 T
im
e 
F
(1
,6
3
) 
V
A
S
 A
n
x
ie
ty
 
Im
R
s 
 
1
8
.2
6
 (
2
2
.2
4
) 
1
3
.9
0
 (
2
0
.0
7
) 
0
.0
0
 
0
.7
5
 
 
0
.4
3
 
 
 
N
IC
 
 
1
6
.5
9
 (
2
1
.9
8
) 
1
6
.0
0
 (
2
3
.0
3
) 
 
 
 
 
V
A
S
 A
n
g
er
 
 
Im
R
s 
 
3
1
.1
0
 (
2
8
.2
8
) 
1
8
.7
1
 (
2
0
.2
2
) 
0
.0
8
 
3
.8
8
 
 
5
.4
6
*
 
 
 
N
IC
 
 
2
6
.1
2
 (
2
9
.2
1
) 
2
7
.1
8
 (
3
0
.3
0
) 
 
 
 
 
V
A
S
 S
h
am
e 
 
Im
R
s 
 
1
9
.5
5
 (
2
5
.6
8
) 
1
0
.7
1
 (
1
4
.0
7
) 
1
.7
3
 
6
.5
8
*
 
 
0
.5
5
 
 
 
N
IC
 
 
2
5
.5
9
 (
3
2
.0
5
) 
2
0
.7
1
 (
3
0
.7
3
) 
 
 
 
 
V
A
S
 G
u
il
t 
 
Im
R
s 
 
1
9
.6
5
 (
2
4
.0
0
) 
1
1
.6
1
 (
1
5
.0
8
) 
0
.8
6
 
2
.1
2
 
 
5
.3
4
*
 
 
 
N
IC
 
 
1
9
.5
0
 (
2
5
.0
3
) 
2
1
.3
2
 (
2
3
.9
2
) 
 
 
 
 
V
A
S
 D
is
g
u
st
  
 
Im
R
s 
 
9
.3
5
 (
2
0
.5
2
) 
8
.4
2
 (
1
8
.5
1
) 
0
.0
7
 
0
.3
8
 
 
0
.0
0
 
 
 
N
IC
 
 
1
0
.7
1
 (
2
0
.3
2
) 
9
.6
2
 (
2
1
.9
5
) 
 
  
  
  
N
o
te
: 
V
A
S
 =
 V
is
u
al
 a
n
al
o
g
u
e 
sc
al
e;
 I
m
R
s 
=
 I
m
ag
er
y
 r
es
cr
ip
ti
n
g
 (
n
 =
 3
1
);
 N
IC
 =
 N
o
-i
n
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 (
n
 =
 3
4
).
 
*
p
 <
 0
.0
5
. 
 
Appendix A 
147 
T
a
b
le
 A
.2
. 
 
F
re
q
u
en
ci
es
 o
f 
in
tr
u
si
v
e 
m
em
o
ri
es
 
 
In
tr
u
si
v
e 
m
em
o
ri
es
 o
f 
th
e 
sc
en
e 
ta
rg
et
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
st
u
d
y
 
 
In
tr
u
si
v
e 
m
em
o
ri
es
 o
f 
o
th
er
 s
ce
n
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ev
en
t 
(n
o
t 
ta
rg
et
ed
 i
n
 t
h
e 
st
u
d
y
) 
 
In
tr
u
si
v
e 
m
em
o
ri
es
 o
f 
th
e 
Im
R
s 
 
Im
R
s 
 
N
IC
 
 
Im
R
s 
 
N
IC
 
 
Im
R
s 
 
In
tr
u
si
v
e 
m
em
o
ri
es
, 
n
 (
%
) 
4
5
 (
1
0
0
) 
 
1
1
5
 (
1
0
0
) 
 
5
9
 (
1
0
0
) 
 
3
6
 (
1
0
0
) 
 
7
 (
1
0
0
) 
  
 I
m
ag
ea
 
2
3
 (
5
1
.1
) 
 
4
3
 (
3
7
.4
) 
 
2
2
 (
3
7
.3
) 
 
1
9
 (
5
2
.8
) 
 
3
 (
4
2
.9
) 
  
 T
h
o
u
g
h
ta
 
1
2
 (
2
6
.7
) 
 
3
9
 (
3
3
.9
) 
 
1
5
 (
2
5
.4
) 
 
 6
 (
1
6
.7
) 
 
3
 (
4
2
.9
) 
  
 C
o
m
b
in
at
io
n
 (
im
ag
e 
an
d
 t
h
o
u
g
h
t)
 a
 
1
0
 (
2
2
.2
) 
 
3
3
 (
2
8
.7
) 
 
2
2
 (
3
7
.3
) 
 
1
1
 (
3
0
.5
) 
 
1
 (
1
4
.3
) 
N
o
te
: 
Im
R
s 
=
 I
m
ag
er
y
 r
es
cr
ip
ti
n
g
 (
n
 =
 3
1
);
 N
IC
 =
 n
o
 i
n
te
rv
en
ti
o
n
 c
o
n
tr
o
l 
co
n
d
it
io
n
 (
n
 =
 3
4
).
 
a 
ca
te
g
o
ri
za
ti
o
n
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
ts
’ 
se
lf
-r
ep
o
rt
 i
n
 t
h
e 
in
tr
u
si
o
n
 d
ia
ry
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: 
 
Supplementary Material Study II 
 
 
Imagery Rescripting of Aversive Autobiographical Memories: Psychological and 
Physiological Effects 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
150 
Table B.1.  
Means (SDs) of emotions and self-reported arousal in response to the memory 
reactivation task before (t0, t1) and after (t3, t4) the interventions.  
  ImRs (n = 27) PI (n = 25) NIC (n = 27) 
Negative emotions 
   Anxious    
     t0 21.13 (23.56) 14.88 (13.55) 22.84  (21.80)
a
 
     t1 43.81 (29.65) 35.12 (23.17) 34.16 (29.27)
a
 
     t3 13.41 (16.39) 25.43 (23.94) 17.89 (19.97) 
     t4 22.65 (26.24) 35.40 (25.84) 28.60 (25.91) 
Angry    
     t0 16.69 (23.04) 16.14 (25.08) 13.82 (22.51)
a
 
     t1 49.58 (30.77) 42.99 (28.39) 45.56 (36.92)
a
 
     t3 15.81 (19.49) 17.47 (16.99) 15.21 (19.56) 
     t4 34.06 (31.09) 37.45 (26.32) 42.96 (31.04) 
Sad     
     t0 28.58 (30.09) 38.70 (30.37) 41.92 (28.01)
a
 
     t1 69.86 (24.52) 71.39 (23.87) 72.31 (27.01)
a
 
     t3 20.43 (21.65) 30.14 (25.06) 24.71 (24.18) 
     t4 44.23 (30.89) 56.98 (25.73) 51.18 (29.99) 
Guilty    
     t0 21.91 (30.90) 13.98 (19.53) 18.59 (19.40)
a
 
     t1 41.66 (33.20) 36.72 (26.35) 38.44 (28.69)
a
 
     t3 11.51 (16.63) 21.05 (21.79) 11.88 (19.20) 
     t4 26.05 (25.45) 33.50 (25.00) 26.57 (29.16) 
Helpless    
     t0 15.28 (24.78) 29.62 (30.66) 28.87 (29.61)
a
 
     t1 57.39 (32.00) 63.17 (23.78) 54.42 (35.51)
a
 
     t3 16.51 (22.50) 27.54 (27.71) 14.57 (21.87) 
     t4 38.03 (33.33) 57.98 (24.30) 44.06 (34.83) 
Positive emotions    
Happy    
     t0 59.41 (18.84) 55.19 (16.80) 51.62 (22.22)
a
 
     t1 26.97 (17.52) 24.32 (18.22) 23.94 (20.64)
a
 
     t3 61.89 (16.53) 58.88 (18.60) 53.99 (22.41) 
     t4 43.15 (12.94) 38.42 (19.98) 32.23 (20.81) 
Satisfied    
     t0 61.83 (21.73) 56.04 (24.30) 52.97 (24.49)
a
 
     t1 29.41 (23.03) 24.82 (18.30) 24.39 (22.93)
a
 
     t3 63.71 (17.48) 54.01 (18.30) 52.91 (23.15) 
     t4 42.74 (15.41) 31.91 (20.87) 30.81 (22.89) 
Proud    
     t0 41.94 (23.68) 43.31  (21.48) 45.85 (25.70)
a 
 
     t1 23.35 (24.60) 29.23 (25.63) 22.76 (24.60)
a
 
     t3 47.09 (20.58) 40.32 (25.54) 35.94 (27.35) 
     t4 38.07 (21.18) 28.00 (24.22) 25.04 (22.61) 
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Note: 
ImRs = Imagery rescripting; PI = Positive imagery; NIC = No-intervention control condition; 
SAM = Self-Assessment Manikin. 
a  
 n = 26  
Table B.1. (continued) 
  ImRs (n = 27) PI (n = 25) NIC (n = 27) 
Arousal 
   SAM    
     t0 4.23 (2.04)
a
 4.00 (1.85) 4.70 (1.92) 
     t1 7.04 (1.11)
a
 6.84 (1.89) 7.07 (1.88) 
     t3 3.70 (1.68) 3.64 (2.00) 3.85 (1.79) 
     t4 5.41 (1.76) 5.84 (1.86) 5.96 (1.85) 
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Figure B.1. Heartrate (bpm) during Session 1 and 2 in imagery rescripting (ImRs), positive 
imagery (PI) and no-intervention control group (NIC).  
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Figure B.2. Skin conductance level (µS) during Session 1 and 2 in imagery rescripting 
(ImRs), positive imagery (PI) and no-intervention control group (NIC).  
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Figure B.3. Facial muscle activity of the m. corrugator supercilii (EMG in µV) during 
Session 1 and 2 in imagery rescripting (ImRs), positive imagery (PI) and no-intervention 
control group (NIC).  
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